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Abstract
Building on scholarship regarding the rise of neoliberalism since the late 1970s and using a
comparative-historical methodology, this thesis examines a case study regarding how state
governments in the United States have succumbed to neoliberal pressures over time. Specifically,
this thesis examines the rapid expansion of concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in
Wisconsin since 1995. As these large CAFOs have grown in size, so have the social and
environmental problems related to their use, including pollution of drinking water sources for
rural communities. Based on analysis of hundreds of newspaper articles, this thesis finds that that
a critical juncture occurred with the demise of the Office of the Public Intervenor, a legally
designated adversarial force unique to the state that had been created in the late 1960s as a
compromise between conservationists and business interests to monitor state enforcement of
environmental regulations, particularly water pollution. Public statements by political leaders
from both parties, conservationists, dairy industry executives, and citizens are analyzed around
three key time periods: the 1966-67 establishment of the Office of the Public Intervenor, the
1984 defense of its role against a challenge by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and the 1995
elimination of the Office. In retrospect, the elimination of the public intervenor was a critical
juncture necessary to create the conditions that enabled CAFOs to expand without the “burden”
of state regulation. Subsequently, through incremental legal changes, Wisconsinites lost access to
legal remedies that could curb polluting practices of large CAFOs. This project adds to the
growing body of sociolegal literature which aims to understand the state-corporate neoliberal
project, particularly how states use law and policy to facilitate the needs of large corporations,
often against the will of their own people.
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Chapter 1: Bringing the Local Back to the Global: Neoliberalization, Rural Communities,
and Regulatory Failure of CAFOs in Wisconsin

Globalization and neoliberalism have had profound impacts on the way industries
conduct business and how states implement environmental policy. From the 1980s to the 1990s,
neoliberal logic, with an emphasis on free markets, limitless growth, and limited government
intervention, came to dominate key economic and political institutions within the world-system
(Arrighi 1994; Harvey 2005; 2007). The spread of neoliberalism was particularly notable in the
United States. However, this thesis adds to the literature that suggests globalization, and the
neoliberal logic that accompanies it, does not spread through “forces of globalization” or “the
invisible hand” alone. Following a range of Marxist and neo-Polanyian scholars, this thesis
works from the existing assumption that neoliberalization needs the state in order to function (see
Sklair 2002; Sassen 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002; Block and Somers 2014). Indeed, for the
purposes of this thesis, the “invisible hand” of the market is less of an abstract occurrence and
more of a system that is advanced by capitalist interests and then enabled by the state through
law. Once law which reflects neoliberal logic is established, its logic becomes harder to
challenge over time or, in the terms of comparative historical analysts, becomes self reinforcing.
While some parts of the state, particularly those concerned with constraining corporate power
and regulating what economists call externalities, may end up weakened by neoliberal policy (as
that is one of its goals), actions of the state are necessary for neoliberalization to be
accomplished.
While the literature within environmental sociology, rural sociology, and political
economy that focuses on globalization and national economies is necessary for the study of
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mature capitalism, research in these areas often omits regional and state-level structural
processes, namely regulatory policy. Rather than assume that neoliberalism occurs in some
automatic or frictionless process, it is critical to analyze regional and state level processes in
addition to national ones in order to understand the conditions over time in which neoliberal
policy does and does not flourish. Indeed, the formal separation of politics, regulatory law, and
neoliberalization disguises the informal and intimate connections that state and local
governments have with special interests (O’Connor 1973). While a focus on shifts in the
structure and corporatization of agriculture is important, it is worth acknowledging that these
changes would not have happened without the regulatory approval of individual states. In the
federal political system of the U.S., states have a considerable amount of control regarding the
natural environment. States have the power not only to weaken environmental policy and
enforcement, but also to provide legal protection for industries that pollute. Still, when citizens
first come up against issues of pollution, their response is typically to reach out to the state
regulatory agency legally tasked with regulating pollution.
Research regarding state response to environmental problems has shown that efforts to
quell corporate polluting practices at the local level may be futile if they conflict with the
economic and political goals of the state (Kolbe 2014; Gaarder 2013; Bonanno and Constance
2006). As a result, agencies tasked with environmental protection are often politicized,
inadequate, and underfunded, leaving citizens in a position where they must fend for themselves
often against large, well-organized corporate interests (Burr et. al. 2013; Cable and Benson
1993). As this thesis will show, some policies and laws and, importantly, their enforcement, are
vital to democratic rule while others support neoliberalism. By investigating the purposive
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actions of the state of Wisconsin to deregulate and otherwise facilitate the rise of large
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) 1, this case study rejects the assumption that the
interests of capital are most effectively achieved by a state that takes a “hands off” approach. In
the case of Wisconsin, the state was and still is critical for the expanding of capitalist agriculture
and, more generally, accumulation of capital.
The shift to large scale farming and use of CAFOs over the past 50 years has coincided
with a vast increase in groundwater pollution across the United States (Centner 2000; Foster and
Magdoff 2000; Wender 2011). According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s
National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress, 17 states classified CAFOs as one of their
top 10 sources of groundwater contamination (Food and Water Watch 2015). Indeed, neighbors
of CAFOs have discovered nitrates, pesticides, endocrine disrupting chemicals, and fecal
bacteria in the water that they use to drink, cook with, and bathe their children (Hribar 2010).
Because of the exposure to these pollutants, people that live around large farms are vulnerable to
CAFO related health problems, such as e coli poisoning, cancers, gastrointestinal issues, and
even miscarriages in pregnant women (Wender 2011; Hribar 2010).
In circumstances where state governments prioritize economic development and
integration into a globalized economy over environmental protection, rural communities are
often left on their own to deal with the health and environmental consequences that the rapid
expansion and underregulation of CAFOs can produce. This is not a task that local municipalities
are capable of handling on their own. In 2012 alone, CAFOs produced 369 million tons of

1

The EPA (n.d) defines CAFOs as animal feeding operations in which are animals are kept and raised in
confinement. CAFOs vary by size depending on the amount and type of animal. For dairy, a small CAFO can
contain 200 cows or fewer. A large CAFO exceeds 1000 cows (EPA n.d.).
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manure, surpassing the amount of waste produced by the entire U.S. population 13 times (Food
and Water Watch 2015). Although proponents of CAFOs claim that the risk associated with
accruing massive amounts of animal waste can be managed, in places like Wisconsin, CAFOs
have employed cheap waste management practices whenever possible while the state repeatedly
fails to enforce existing regulations that protect rural drinking water sources (Bergquist 2017;
Socially Responsible Agricultural Project 2015; Seely 2010b).
Between 1995 and 2010, the dairy industry in Wisconsin began to follow similar patterns
of neoliberalization found in other states such as California, Washington, and New York (see
figure 1). These patterns included an increase in scale, increased concentration, use of
technology, and corporatization. The rise of CAFOs produced serious social and environmental
problems across Wisconsin which, despite contestation from the dairy industry, have been
acknowledged by the state (Seely 2014). Wisconsin witnessed the decline of small and medium

sized farms over a short period due to harsh competition from farmers who embraced industrial
agriculture and the use of CAFOs (see figure 2). During this period of change, many farmers had
to make the tough decision to sell their farms or adopt the CAFO model of dairy production
themselves.

Figure 1: Changes in CAFO Density 1997-2012 (Factory Farm Map 2015)
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!
Figure 2: Changes in Dairy Farm Herd Size in Wisconsin from 1997-2007 (Burr et. al.
2013)

However, before the 1990s this transition was neither obvious nor predictable. Well into
the 1990s, at a time when the dairy industry throughout the United States had already embraced
CAFO use, Wisconsin was still associated with the small, family farm model of farming (Gilbert
and Akor 1988; see figure 1). Therefore, in the case of Wisconsin, this accelerated shift to the
CAFO model of production in dairy farming seemed peculiar and the pace and timing of the shift
required explanation. In this thesis, I will examine this process of state-facilitated neoliberal
deconstruction of the state in the dairy farming agricultural sector of Wisconsin over time. This
project uses comparative historical analysis of key periods of environmental policy in Wisconsin,
specifically pertaining to the dairy industry, to understand: 1) the timing and conditions favorable
to neoliberalization, 2) how the relationship between the state, the public, the environment, and
industry changed over the last several decades and, 3) the role of state lawmaking in the
processes of neoliberalization.
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This case study is divided into 7 chapters. Following this introduction is the conceptual
framework in chapter 2. Chapter 2 addresses theories regarding the state-corporate neoliberal
project within the fields of rural sociology, environmental sociology, and political economy.
Specifically, the chapter highlights theories the role of the state in relation to globalization and
neoliberalization, as well as the literature encompassing problems related to CAFOs and
structural changes within U.S. agriculture. Chapter 3, or the research methods chapter, not only
identifies my data sources and processes of analysis, but also includes a description of the data
collection process, or what I call my “research journey.” Chapters 4 and 5 contextualizes this
case study in time and space. In chapter 4, I introduce the problems associated with the CAFO
model as well as problems with the regulation (or deregulation) of CAFOs in Wisconsin today.
Then, in chapter 5, I shift to a discussion of the history of environmental protection in Wisconsin
over time, specifically, I introduce the Office of the Public Intervenor and provide 3 political
histories of periods including the creation (1967), a critical legal challenge (1984), and its
elimination (1995). This chapter is followed by my findings, which are presented in chapter 6. In
chapter 6, I started with a comparative analysis of key changes across each of the periods and
subsequently formulated detailed descriptions of each of the debates. Within chapter 6, 1995 is
identified as a critical juncture for CAFO development. Lastly, the concluding chapter serves to
connect my findings to instances of contemporary social mobilization in Wisconsin and theories
of the state-corporate neoliberal project as well as contemporary social movements regarding
these environmental problems.
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework
Arguably, the dominant framework in the social sciences and sociology to the study of
modern agriculture involves globalization. Indeed, over the last three decades, the agricultural
industry in the United States has grown in average in size and global reach. The globalization
literature highlights the increased use of transnational corporations and the neoliberal structural
logic that accompanies them. All of these changes directly encourage the use of the CAFO model
of production in agriculture which proliferated in Wisconsin after 1995.
Globalization, Neoliberalization, and the Role of the State
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, industrial agribusinesses were
transformed by transnational corporations. Not only did these corporations now have access to
cheaper labor, technological advancements, and lax environmental regulations around the world,
but they could absorb fiscal losses through branches in other countries (Heffernan 2000). A key
characteristic of this new globalized era, as noted by Habermas (2002), Harvey (1989) and
Giddens (2000), was capital hypermobility in which capital was able to quickly and easily move
around the world. Increased capital mobility encouraged theorists to renew their efforts to
theorize the relationship between corporations and the state. The global food and agri-business
sector has been a fertile area of research for sociologists and political economists to examine
these relationships. Thus, this literature review highlights the key works and critiques of this
area.
According to Bonanno and Constance (2006), the literature on the impact of global
capital hypermobility on the state-corporate relationship can be divided into several key
perspectives. The first perspective theorizes the state as a toothless entity that has lost its power

!8
to regulate and resist the influence of transnational corporations (McMichael 2004; Friedmann
and McMichael 1989; Buttell and Jackson Smith 1998). The role of the state, then, is to aide the
expansion of capitalist interests. Friedmann and McMichael (1989) note that as the goals of the
global agri-food system shift to the production of goods for affluent global markets, this not only
decreases the ability of the state to control the local food system, but forces the state to become a
facilitator of global capitalist interests. In fact, as mentioned by Bonanno and Constance (2006),
transnational corporations will often pit states against each other in order to extract regulatory
concessions. In these cases, changes within state-market relations are understood as being caused
by globalization itself.
The second perspective, while acknowledging the pull of global capitalist interests,
argues that the state is not a powerless actor under globalization (Arrighi 1994; Koc 1994;
Bonanno and Constance 2006; Kinchy et al 2008). Koc (1994), for example, highlights the role
of nation-states in the decision to cooperate and expand global capitalist institutions like the
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization. Neoliberalism-- what Kinchy et al.
(2008) call a “utopian political ideology”-- posits that all societies would benefit from private
property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade (Harvey 2007). In
contrast to the pervasive notion that neoliberalization is driven by global market forces, it is
explicitly noted by critical political economy literature that neoliberalization is a state-corporate
project (Sklair 2002; Sassen 2001; Peck and Tickell 2002). Kinchy et al (2008) falls within this
second perspective because they specifically warn against conceptualizing state deregulation in
mature capitalism as a result of an abstract process of globalization. Rather, empirical research
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suggests that institutional shifts toward neoliberal ideologies occur due to , “... political struggle,
diffusion, imitation, translation, learning and experimentation,” (Campbell and Pedersen 2003).
Taking this perspective even further, a third group of scholars argue that the state not only
has a key role in this process, but has the ability to resist forces of globalization. The growth of
corporate influence and activity and the problems associated with it clash with the objective of
the state to maintain legitimacy (O’Connor 1974). The goal of the state in relation to its citizens
is “...often contradictory to the designs of global producers and retailers whose capital
accumulation activities are not necessarily linked to legitimative processes,” (Bonanno and
Constance 2006: 67). These states, then, are more likely than corporations to face and respond to
backlash by impacted communities against the will of corporate actors (Boggs 2000).
Changes in the Structure and Regulation of the United States Dairy Industry
Analysis of the agricultural industry in the United States provides key insights into the
study of state-facilitated neoliberalization. Agriculture in the U.S. has followed a pattern of
increased scale, concentration, and integration since at least the 1930s (Friedmann and
McMichael 1989; DuPuis 1993; Albrecht 1997). From the 1930s-2000s (except for a small,
temporary rise in family farms in the 1980s: see Albrecht 1997) there was a dramatic decrease in
the number of small farms and an increase in farm size. In 1935, large industrialized farms were
only 1.3 percent of all farms and managed about 29 percent of farmland in the US (Albrecht
1997). However, by 1992, the share of large farms had grown to 9 percent and managed 65
percent of U.S. farmland. Indeed, “The exodus of Americans from farming is one of the most
dramatic changes in the U.S. economy and society in the past century,” (Lobao and Meyer 2001:
103). As a result, according to Buttell et al. (2001), the number of farms in the United States
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decreased from 7 million in the 1930s to less than 2 million by the 1990s. These large-scale
agricultural transitions had profound manifestations in communities whose cultures and
livelihoods were deeply tied to family farms for generations. Lobao and Meyer (2001) noted that,
“Displacement of farmers from farming, in effect, is an indicator of the system’s success,” (110).
When animal agriculture, including meat, dairy, and egg production, started to
industrialize, it typically happened rapidly (Buttell et al 2000). This trend occurred in most states
active in the dairy industry, although it did not fully embrace industrialization until the late 20th
century (Buttell and Jackson Smith 1998). Between 1970 and 2006, the number of farms with
dairy cows dropped 88 percent while dairy operations with more than 2,000 cows grew 104.6
percent between 2000 and 2006 alone (Socially Responsible Agricultural Project 2015). The
CAFO model in animal agriculture advocates a structure in which hundreds to thousands of
animals reside on one plot of land. The growth in the use of the CAFO model is a dramatic shift
from the previously typical small farming model which utilized 100 cows or fewer. Analysis by
the United States Department of Agriculture notes that, “In 1992, the midpoint of 101 cows was
not much larger than the mean [of 61 dairy cows], reflecting the fact that most cows were on
small and mid-size dairy farms. However, the midpoint rose sharply over the next two decades,
to 900 cows by 2012, over 6 times larger than the mean herd size” (MacDonald and Newton
2014).
Interestingly, this transformation in the scale of dairying has not been uniform, either
globally or in the United States. Various scholars have noted that there are key distinctions
between states, that have either accelerated the growth of industrial agriculture or slowed their
expansion, albeit temporarily (DuPuis 1993; Gilbert and Akor 1988). In a comparative historical
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study of dairy farm structure in California and Wisconsin, Gilbert and Akor (1988) found that
between 1950 and 1982, Wisconsin, unlike California during the same period, was able to resist
what they called the “logics of production.” Specifically, Wisconsin maintained a small, mostly
family oriented structure of dairy farming. During this period, their analysis found persistent
“...historical patterns of social organization in agriculture of the respective states,” (Gilbert and
Akor 1988: 66).
To understand these differences, they turn to historical, cultural, and ideological factors.
Unlike California, they argue, Wisconsin has a dairy culture that was “...established in the late
nineteenth century by an informal network of dairy farmers and their associations,
agriculturalists at the University of Wisconsin, agribusiness leaders like the editor of Hoard’s
Dairyman, and state government officials,” (Gilbert and Akor 1988:67). These groups supported
and maintained, “an ideology of progressive dairying,” (Gilbert and Akor 1988: 67). These
progressive and politically influential groups pressured the state to form and enforce policy that
preserved the traditional structure of small family dairying and the ecosystems around them .
Since California, by contrast, did not have such an ideology, the government played a different
role in agricultural development. Specifically, the state of California enacted policies that
encouraged the use of industrial dairy farming. These policies were critical for the initial
development of large dairy farms in California throughout the 1930s. This thesis will focus on
the latter part of the 20th century when Wisconsin did, in fact, follow the patterns of
industrialization that were present in California’s early dairy industry.
As agricultural firms grew in size over time, there was an increased demand amongst
these firms for animal biotechnology. According to Kinchy et al (2008), the increased use of
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agricultural biotechnology is associated with, “...accelerating consolidation and small farm loss,
creating farmer dependence on multinational corporations, and driving prices down by
stimulating overproduction.” The dairy industry was the first within the agricultural sector to
benefit from products that were created with biotechnology (Kinchy et al 2008). In 1986,
Monsanto-- a multinational agrochemical corporation-- requested approval by the Food and Drug
Administration for a hormone designed to increase milk production in cattle called the
recombinant bovine growth hormone (rBGH). The literature suggests that as soon as
biotechnology was introduced, specifically because of when and for whom it was introduced, it
developed into a state-corporate neoliberal project despite objections from politicians and
constituents from dairying states like California and Wisconsin (Mills 2002). The product was
designed for dairy farmers to maximize their milk outputs. Ironically, goal of the federal
government was to do the opposite. During the mid-1980s, the federal government was still
trying to remedy a crisis of overproduction in the dairy industry. At the same time Monsanto
requested approval for rBGH, the federal government had just instituted the Dairy Termination
Program , a voluntary buyout program in which the government would, “...buy out an entire
dairy herd and obtain a commitment from the participating farmers not to partake in dairying for
the next five years,” (Erba and Novakovic 1995: 15). The cattle would instead be used for meat
production or exported to other countries. Indeed, Neal Jorgensen, the Dean of the College of
Agriculture at the University of Wisconsin, noted that Monsanto’s request. “...could not have
come at a worse time,” (U.S. House of Representatives 1986).
Using discursive institutional analysis, Kinchy et. al. (2008) examine the debates in
Congress around the approval of rBGH. According to their analysis, the introduction of rBGH
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was met with hostility from both farmers and farm advocates who claimed that this product
would hurt small family farms. Multiple studies circulating at the time noted that there would be
significant losses to small farmers if rBGH was to be approved (Collier 2000). However, as the
debate went on, socio-economic considerations began to gain less traction. The Reagan
Administration decided that agricultural biotechnology would be regulated the same way as
biotechnology meant for humans. This decision was a key moment in the embrace of neoliberal
logic because a clause within the regulation stated, “... among other things, regulations must
minimize the regulatory burden and accommodate rapid advances in biotechnology,” (Kinchy et
al. 2008: 164). Small farm groups immediately responded with a petition to the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration. A Wisconsin farmer who supported the petition said, “It is legitimate to
question whether technological advancements are social progress.…Bovine Growth Hormone is
not in the good culturally and socially for the industry on which it will have its impact...There is
one key question: What do we want rural America to look like and what kind of society do we
want functioning in rural America?” (Kinchy et al. 2008: 164) Despite the opinions of experts
and the social mobilization against the drug, it was approved. In the EU, however, rBGH was
banned based not only on the socioeconomic consequences of the drug’s use, but due to animal
welfare concerns, a policy which continues to this day.
The use of CAFOs and neoliberal logic go hand in hand. The CAFO model of production
is designed to maximize profit for the entities that own them and for as cheap as possible.
However, this goal is complicated when the state has strong and enforceable environmental
regulations. Environmental problems caused by inappropriate waste disposal have been an issue
for industry from the beginning and the agricultural sector is hardly dissimilar. Through
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environmental deregulation, the state chooses, often against the will of their own people, to
facilitate the goals of industry in increasingly problematic ways. The state, then, in its role as
regulator of the environment, and in some cases technology, has a key role in neoliberalization.
Indeed, this thesis adds to the second group of scholars listed above which decide against
framing the state in the era of neoliberalism and globalization as toothless and weak. While that
may be the end result, this perspective ignores the actions of the state in processes of
neoliberalization which are central to this thesis.
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Chapter 3: Methods- The Research Journey
This thesis is a comparative historical within-case study of changes in environmental law
and the regulation of the Wisconsin dairy industry. The goal of this research is to combine a
historical political economy of the growth of CAFOs with a narrative analysis of three key time
periods in Wisconsin’s political and legal history. Through a comparison of these critical
junctures, my aim is to track processes of legal neoliberalization within and around proposed
laws which permitted and emboldened dairy CAFOs to proliferate over a short period of time.
Process of Analysis
In the 1990s, historical sociologists began to privilege the use of narratives for causal
analysis. Narrative analysis is a methodology in which, “...historical reality is conceptualized
‘not as time-bounded snapshots within which ‘causes’ affect one another... but as stories,
cascades of events’ in which ‘complex actors encounter complex structures,’” (Abbott 1992: 227;
Gotham and Staples 1996: 483). Narratives have a built-in emphasis on time because they
require the analyst to produce some form of temporal ordering to make sense of events. Narrative
analysis is particularly constructive for this project because I sought to understand the underlying
logic of social and political processes over time. Whether or not the narratives used to push
legislation are true or false, the narratives served a political purpose.
However, narrative analysis has been critiqued for failing to recognize causal
mechanisms and trajectories across time periods (Haydu 1998). Scholars have noted that the
addition of path dependency remedies issues that can occur with the use of narrative analysis
alone (Sewell 1996; Levi 1997). Path dependency narratives, according to Haydu (1998: 352)
“...begin with a historical fork in the road; identify the turn taken and emphasize how subsequent
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developments make that choice irreversible.” According to Arthur (1994), path dependency is
characterized by some form of a positive feedback loop. Steps along one path make some
choices more attractive than others. Once a path is chosen, “...such effects begin to accumulate,
[and] they generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing activity,” (Pierson 2004: 18). Indeed, the
longer a path is in place, the harder it becomes to shift. Path dependency is used in this thesis to
understand when the logic of neoliberalism and neoliberal policy took hold in Wisconsin and
how, once in place, it became harder to challenge.
Path dependence is useful to the study of political dynamics because politics are
particularly prone to positive feedback (Pierson 2004). According to Pierson (2004), path
dependence in politics is marked by four features. First, when conditions favorable to a certain
path start to take hold, the path is marked by uncertainty because during these critical junctures a
number of outcomes could still take place. This initial political uncertainty emphasizes the
second feature of contingency; even a small event can have lasting consequences if the
conditions are favorable. Contingency is described by Berlin as, “...the study of what happened
in the context of what could have happened?” (Berlin 1974: 176). It highlights the opportunism
that occurs in politics, a practice which has a tendency to prefer short term policy solutions that
can still have lasting impacts. The third feature, which relates to contingency, is the importance
of timing and sequencing. Indeed, timing and sequence are key to understanding path
dependence because, “When things happen within a sequence affects how they happen,” (Tilly
1994: 18). Early parts of a sequence set up the events that follow. After certain paths are in place,
an event that happens “too late” can have less of an impact in than it would have earlier. Lastly,
after the path has been established, it develops positive feedback and as a result, becomes more
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difficult to challenge over time. In this regard, path dependency merges with sociological
considerations of power to foster understanding of why certain structures remain in place so long
despite dissent.
For the purposes of studying social change in the Wisconsin regulatory environment, this
thesis focuses on the former rather than the latter processes involved in path dependence.
Particularly, my analysis hones in on one specific critical juncture and its effects over time.
Within comparative historical analysis, critical junctures are, “...moments in which uncertainty as
to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a
decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development, a path that then
persists over a long period of time,” (Capoccia 2015: 147). The critical juncture approach notes
that after events which cause political uncertainty, key actors have more social agency than they
would otherwise (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) Additionally, the conditions that exist at the time
of the decision limit the types of decisions available, but does not determine them. Therefore, the
questions that guided my analysis of narratives and path dependency created included:
1. Who supported particular laws and policies and what were their publicly political
rationales for doing so?
2. Which arguments did the state accept in the end? Which ones did they reject? Which
claims were dominant?
3. Which political rationales are reflected in the language of the law? Did the laws and
policies adopted reflect neoliberal ideology?
Data Sources and Collection Process
This project began as a case study of Kewaunee County, Wisconsin, which has been
identified as a key site for CAFO development (Burr et al. 2013; Socially Responsible
Agricultural Project 2015). Kewaunee County is interesting for a case study not only because it

!18
has the highest rate of animal concentration in the state, but the environmental conditions in this
county are not conducive to the existence of large farms. This county and several others which
surround it, including Brown, Door, and Manitowoc, are located near large bodies of surface
water around the Great Lakes. However, the most pressing concern for neighbors of CAFOs in
Kewaunee County is the pollution of underground aquifers where 95% of the population receives
their drinking water. Much of Northeastern Wisconsin is located on top of highly fractured
carbonate bedrock, or karst topography, and are as a result susceptible to groundwater
contamination. When excessive untreated manure is spread on fields, the nutrients that cannot be
soaked into the plants inevitably end up somewhere else in the environment. Interaction with rain
or snow causes the manure to flow through the cracks and sinkholes in the ground and directly
into underground aquifers. Indeed, some farmers have noted that the ground is so weak that
sinkholes the size of tractors can appear in short periods of time (Golden 2014). The fact that the
state kept allowing these large CAFOs to expand in an area with already vulnerable water
resources warranted investigation.
In interviews with the state press and on social media, residents of Kewaunee County put
specific emphasis on the 2005 Livestock Facility Siting Law as a cause of CAFO growth (Seely
2010b; Burr et. al. 2013). However, further investigation indicated that CAFO growth could not
have been promoted by the siting law alone. While the siting law was very important for control
of specific CAFO locations, it did not address why, even in cases against CAFO pollution that
were successful in the courts, the punishments against CAFOs amounted to a slap on the wrist
and required them to simply monitor their wells more often without changing their practices
(Bergquist 2014). Using LexisNexis and resources available online from Midwest Environmental
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Advocates, I searched for agricultural regulations that could possibly have influenced access to
remedies available through the courts in Wisconsin. Environmental law reviews proved to be
critical at this stage because they provided in-depth histories and explanations of key
environmental laws that governed CAFOs, particularly the right to farm law. From these
analyses, it became clear that before the siting law, the RTF law was crucial to the expansion of
CAFOs because it limited the remedies available to citizens impacted by CAFOs. As noted by
Centner (2000; 2006) and Hansen (2002), Wisconsin’s 1995 RTF law was particularly broad and
explicitly referenced limitations on the restrictions the state could place on CAFO pollution even
if a lawsuit was successfully carried out against them. The RTF law also specifically shaped the
role of the courts in their ability to regulate the activity of CAFOs. However, this law was passed
in 1996, almost a decade before the siting law.
As I learned about these laws and well before learning about the public intervenor’s
office, my focus was on the most prominent environmental regulatory agency in Wisconsin, the
WDNR, because of its failure to properly regulate large farms. However, after working
backwards in Wisconsin’s regulatory history, I found out that not only was there a distinct period
in which the WDNR was accused of becoming “politicized,” but this period coincided with the
elimination of the public intervenor. Starting from a case in the modern era, the existence of the
public intervenor in Wisconsin did not make sense politically or in terms of neoliberal logic.
How was it possible that a place like Wisconsin today, a reflection of neoliberal logic, had a
legacy of a watchdog agency to police the WDNR? What were the political and social conditions
in which this agency was created and how were the circumstances in which it was eliminated
different? Could this watchdog have interfered with CAFO growth?
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When I began to recognize the importance of the public intervenor, law reviews from
Wisconsin also provided important accounts of the office (Sinykin 2004). Sinykin’s (2004)
history of the public intervenor, while it had little mention of the siting law or RTF law, outlined
the rise, the accomplishments, and the decline of the public intervenor. Recognizing the
importance of the public intervenor necessitated the addition of two periods (1967 and 1984)
because of the stark contrast between the environmental legislation of the former and latter
periods. Beyond Sinykin and Huffman (2000), the literature regarding the public intervenor was
very limited. Yet recognizing its potential importance, I decided to use online newspaper
archives such as Lexisnexis, newspapers.com, and newspaperarchives.com to trace the existence
of the public intervenor and to understand why it existed, how it remained for almost thirty years,
and why it was eliminated. In essence, I was trying to understand how Wisconsin reached the
point of a neoliberal logic of (de)regulation that exists today.
I started with the 1995 period on the newspapers.com archive with a keyword search of
“public intervenor” and restricted those searches to papers from Wisconsin during 1995. Key
sources for all of the periods included the Daily Tribune, the Green Bay Press Gazette, and the
Madison Capital Times. Newspaper sources also included local papers such as the Fond Du Lac
Commonwealth Reporter, the Stevens Point Journal, the Post Crescent, the Wausau Daily
Herald, the Oshkosh Northwestern, and the Sheboygan Press. The search yielded 256 matches
with all of them sorted by “best match” which corresponded to the number of times the term
appeared in the articles. In many cases, the same article was printed in several papers. I saved
articles that identified who supported or opposed the intervenor and the their reasons why. After
the articles became repetitive or vague, I sorted them based on their quotes, meaning that I coded
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the articles based on whether the quote was from a politician or another representative of the
state, a representative from a corporation, a citizen, a member of an environmental or sportsmen
group, or the press. Then, I worked through the articles and typed out key quotes by hand and
sorted them again into “for” and “against” eliminating the intervenor in order to pick up on
narrative themes. I followed this protocol for all of the other periods as well
At this point, I was still examining the original four periods identified. However, after
engaging in data collection for the right to farm law in 1995 and the livestock law in 2004, I was
surprised by the lack of data hits compared to the 1995 search for “public intervenor.” A search
for “right to farm” around the time of the debates yielded only 50 articles, many of which were
either one article printed in multiple papers or vague descriptions of what the law was. This data
was completely different from the specific quotations and the detailed narratives available in the
public intervenor debate. Even more surprising, a search for the livestock law yielded 0 results in
the year before and during the passage of the law when the debates should have occurred.
Subsequently, a more expansive search on LexisNexis revealed that debates around this law did
not seem to occur until 2008 and 2009, years after the law was already passed. Based on this
time lag, I began to suspect that the public intervenor may have had an impact on educating the
public and, as a result, decided to restructure the thesis and shift my narrative focus to the three
periods around the rise (1967), the expansion (1984), and the fall of the public intervenor (1995).
My method was to work secondary sources and newspaper archives in tandem. The
principle secondary source for the political history of the period surrounding the creation of the
public intervenor was Huffman’s (2000) Protectors of the Land and Water: Environmentalism in
Wisconsin, 1961-1968. This text not only provided detailed political context regarding the
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commission that proposed major changes to the state of Wisconsin, but also descriptions of the
actors who supported or became a part of the “red shirt” movement of outdoorsmen and hunters.
It acted as a key reference when my initial search using “public intervenor” in 1967 had 0 results.
When I used the terms “kellett commission”, “conservation”, “merger”, or a combination of
each, around 75 to 150 hits would appear. The results corrected my initial hypothesis that the
creation of the office was the result of a progressive legacy and dairy culture. Instead, I found
that the creation was the result of a political compromise.
Then, from Sinykin’s (2004) account, I realized that 1984 was an important period to
examine because the intervenor was strengthened at that time. The result was that I collected data
related to a rich comparison of political differences between 1967 and 1995. In 1984, the US was
undergoing a new wave of conservatism and push towards neoliberalization. The fact that the
intervenor at that time was strengthened by the legislature seemed peculiar. The search for
“public intervenor” during Wisconsin in 1984 yielded 173 results. However, those results were
misleadingly inflated because the public intervenor was involved with many debates at the time.
The articles that involved the intervenor did not consistently address the debate around the
decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Therefore, I restricted my search with the addition of
the terms “supreme court.” It was with this search that I found an article in the Sheboygan Press
with exact quotes from a key public hearing addressing the proposed role of the public intervenor
in February of 1984. Within a month of this debate, the legislature decided to reinstate and
strengthen the intervenor.
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Chapter 4: Wisconsin: Deconstructing CAFO Growth in America’s Dairyland
The Rising Tide of Waste: Wisconsin, Regulatory Law, and CAFOs
When told to imagine what is historically described as a farm, the common mental
images entail grazing animals, rolling hills, and green pastures. However, the reality of farming
today is quite different. Most of the meat and dairy produced in the United States comes from
large CAFOs (Wender 2011). On a dairy CAFO, cows do not graze or even leave the long
buildings that commonly contain thousands of cows at one time. Agricultural technology, such as
growth hormones and mechanical milking parlors, allow the producers to milk hundreds of cows
at the same time for twenty-four hours a day (Bergquist 2017). Feed is grown and waste is
disposed of on the same plot of land. Proponents of CAFOs have maintained that the CAFO
model is beneficial because, “CAFOs can provide [consumers with] a low-cost source of meat,
milk, and eggs, due to efficient feeding and housing of animals, increased facility size, and
animal specialization,” (Kolbe 2013: 419). The CAFO industry additionally claims to improve
local economies by providing jobs and tax revenue. The CAFO model reflects the discourse and
logics of the neoclassical economic perspective which encourage pursuit of profit, growth in
technology to aide efficiency and highlights individual rational actors within a self-regulating
marketplace.
Waste management and disposal practices of CAFO managers are at the heart of the
debate around CAFOs in Wisconsin and beyond. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
regulates CAFOs under the Clean Water Act . While manure is typically considered to be a nonpoint source pollutant under agency regulations, CAFOs are regulated as point sources because
of the immense amount of animal waste they are capable of producing. CAFOs account for 65
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percent of all animal waste produced annually (Gurian-Sherman 2008). Typically, the waste from
hundreds or thousands of animals is kept untreated in open air lagoons or storage units until a
portion of that waste is used to spread on fields. Despite the use of USDA and state approved
nutrient management plans and permits, CAFOs have consistently engaged in “excessive”
manure spreading. Analysis of the land available in Wisconsin for spreading versus amount of
waste produced indicates that the amount of waste produced by farms is too large to be spread on
fields in responsible amounts. In 2013, farms in Wisconsin produced around 12.4 million pounds
of nitrogen (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 2014). Since the land was only able to
grow enough crops to utilize 11.2 million pounds of nitrogen, an excess of 1.2 million pounds of
nitrogen were partially kept in lagoons or lost to the environment around farms. Still, CAFO
managers claim that this waste is an invaluable tool for farmers to keep soil healthy (Kinnard
Farms n.d.).
Excessive spreading is essentially a form of deliberate and cheap waste disposal for large
dairy farms. Records from the DNR repeatedly indicate that CAFOs engage in excessive
spreading as well as winter spreading when their manure storage facilities fail to contain the
amount of manure produced (Socially Responsible Agricultural Project 2015). The results of
excessive and winter spreading include harm to surface water and freshwater resources as excess
nitrogen and phosphorus is swept into nearby waterways and underground aquifers.The result is
a number of environmental and social problems. Excessive nutrients in surface water have the
potential to create irreversible damage to local ecosystems. Around 70 percent of the runoff in
Wisconsin comes from agricultural sources (VanEgeren 2014). Some ecological consequences of
the runoff are increases in toxic algal blooms and spontaneous fish kills (Golden 2014a).
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Additionally, CAFOs, like all businesses, have accidents. If a truck carrying manure crashes or a
large lagoon breaks- and there are several cases of exactly this (Socially Responsible Agricultural
Project 2015)- large amounts of manure are dumped not only back into the ecosystem, but into
the roadways and groundwater of rural communities.
Despite the fact that CAFOs are required to limit pollution under both state and federal
regulations, rural sociologists, environmental lawyers, and public health experts have noted the
consistent negative environmental and public health impacts by CAFOs on rural communities,
especially in states that prioritize economic development (Burmeister 2002; Hribar 2010; Kolbe
2013). Communities that rely heavily on access to wells for drinking water are particularly
vulnerable to the impacts on groundwater pollution caused by CAFOs. Samples of well water
contaminated by CAFO pollution reveal the presence of nitrates, pathogenic organisms,
pesticides, and antibiotic resistant bacteria (Hribar 2010). Rural communities that live adjacent to
large CAFOs in northeastern Wisconsin have elected to switch to bottled water for their daily
needs instead of relying on possibly contaminated groundwater water resources that were not
being protected by the WDNR (Seely 2015).
The literature in both law and sociology indicate that groups that support the CAFO
model of agriculture have used law to create political conflict between the state and rural
communities (Welsh and Grey 2000; Burmeister 2002; Bonanno and Constance 2006).
Interestingly, legal scholars, not sociologists, have identified specific laws that give CAFO
managers and owners legal advantages which simultaneously disadvantage the communities that
live around them (Centner 2000; Kolbe 2013; Centner and Alcorn 2015). For example, while
almost every state in the US has a Right to Farm law (RTF), the RTF law in Wisconsin goes
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further than others and limits the ability of the state to enforce environmental regulations and
restrict the remedies available for aggrieved residents in court (Centner 2009). Similar
limitations in neighboring Iowa’s RTF law were declared unconstitutional by the Iowa Supreme
Court twice for infringing on the rights of property owners (Centner 2006; Kolbe 2013). States
with a high number of CAFOs such as Wisconsin and Georgia, have additionally enacted
“preemptive ordinances” which challenge the capacity of local governments to use law to protect
the groundwater sources in the environments they live in (Centner and Alcorn 2015).
Wisconsin as a Negative Case Study
Wisconsin is a fascinating case for the study of the neoliberalization of the dairy industry.
First, Wisconsin has experienced an accelerated version of the structural changes in farming that
places around the U.S. have experienced, despite the fact that the small family farm model was
dominant there throughout most of the 20th century (DuPuis 1993). The dairy industry in
Wisconsin today is a key player in the global cheesemaking industry. Secondly, counties all over
the state are having to confront environmental problems caused by these under regulated
industries. Lastly, the state in the past had an environmental agency that could have addressed
many of the problems caused by CAFOs today. Indeed, the public intervenor was unique to the
state of Wisconsin.
One of the key questions this thesis addresses is the timing of the expansion of dairy
CAFOs. Thus, built into the design of this case is an implicit comparison with the dairy industry
in California, New York, and other dairying states. The case of the dairy industry in Wisconsin
raises some important questions. Despite the fact that Wisconsin took much longer to adopt the
CAFO model of production, Wisconsin currently ranks as the second largest producer of milk
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behind California, which has three times the land area of Wisconsin and a longer legacy of
CAFO use (Goodling 2016).
In the case of Wisconsin, the historical and political context is important to consider.
Each of the conjectures occurred during particular historical moments in the development of
neoliberalism. In the late 1960s, there was not only a growing national environmental movement
in the United States, but neoliberalism was, at that point, an abstract idea proliferating through
the discipline of economics (Peck and Tickell 2002). The embrace of state neoliberalization by
Thatcher and Reagan in the 1980s thrust neoliberal logic into the spotlight. Throughout the
1990s, United States was ready and willing to expand free trade with agreements such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement and the Global Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. By the
early 2000s, neoliberal logic was so deeply integrated into policy that it was rendered invisible
and assumed to be necessary in order for the market to function (Harvey 2005).

!28
Chapter 5: The History of the Rise and Fall of the Office of the Public Intervenor
Introducing the Office of the Public Intervenor
A key focal point of this thesis is the role of the public intervenor in Wisconsin. The
office of the public intervenor served some very important political, social, and environmental
purposes throughout the twenty-eight years that it was active (Sinykin 2004). The public
intervenor was created in 1968 as a “lobbyist for the public” in matters of environmental law,
particularly issues with water pollution. The public intervenor was unique to the state of
Wisconsin. The tasks of the office were to: 1) act as a watchdog agency and political counter to
the DNR, 2) share information with and educate citizens about their environmental rights, 3)
teach citizens how to get the state to acknowledge grievances and enforce regulations without
using litigation, 4) litigate on behalf of individuals or groups of citizens in need, and 5) advance
or create legislation that strengthened environmental policy. During the period in which the
public intervenor was active, Wisconsin paved the way for environmental policy in the United
States. Indeed, the public intervenor was created two years before the United States
Environmental Protection Agency. Despite the fact that the public intervenor never was staffed
by more than two or three lawyers and a number of environmental law students, the public
intervenor was able to establish a number of environmental policies and win important court
cases (Sinykin 2004). Wisconsin was the first state to ban the use of DDT, the first state to pass
acid rain legislation, and created one of the most comprehensive groundwater protection laws in
the country by 1984. The public intervenor enjoyed public support even after it was eliminated in
1995.
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This comparative historical analysis is structured around the existence of the public
intervenor. The initial selection of the periods used in this analysis was based on specific legal
changes in the history of environmental law in Wisconsin that seemed legally necessary for the
growth of CAFO development. Each period was marked by the debate and passage of specific
pieces of legislation related to the public intervenor. First, from 1966-1967, there was a tense
political struggle between conservationists and developers and an eventual compromise that
resulted in the establishment of the public intervenor. Second, in 1984, public intervenor
survived a major legal challenge by the Wisconsin Supreme Court with the assistance of the state
legislature. Third, in 1995, Governor Thompson and a Conservative dominated state legislature
pushed through a number of changes which pointed Wisconsin’s regulatory regime in a
neoliberal direction. Until that point, Republicans had consistently been a part of maintaining the
legacy of conservation in environmental policy.
Kellett Commission and the Reorganization Bill- 1965-1967
The establishment of the public intervenor as an internal watchdog and adversarial force
amongst environmental agencies of Wisconsin was originally part of a political compromise. The
context for the creation of the public intervenor was an early struggle over the size and role of
the Wisconsin state government. In stark contrast to the more recent period, environmentalists
knowns as conservationists were ascendent politically and well positioned to withstand pressure
from business interests and government officials focused on growth and development.
During the winter of 1965, with a mandate from the Wisconsin Legislature, Republican
Governor Warren Knowles set forth one of the most ambitious reorganization projects in the
history of Wisconsin’s state government. The goal of this project was to maximize efficiency and
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minimize the cost of state programs (Huffman 2000). According to Knowles, “The biggest
business in Wisconsin is the least efficiently organized,” (The Oshkosh Northwestern 1967).
Ideally, to Knowles and many of his Republican colleagues, the best way to run the state was like
a business. Therefore, to make this goal a reality, Knowles established an executive order to
assemble a task force that consisted of local business experts. One of these experts, and the head
of this task force, was William Kellett, previously the CEO of Kimberly-Clark Paper
Corporation. Both Kellett and Knowles aimed to restructure the state according to conservative
and laissez faire principles. The initial commission was made up of, “...almost one hundred
business leaders representing ninety-seven firms [who] met to devise a way to eliminate
‘inefficiency’ and shake up the ‘comfortable state bureaucracy,’” (Huffman 2000). While the
second commission was more bipartisan, it was not representative of conservation interests.
However, political conditions at the time made the goals of Kellett, Knowles, and
Republicans particularly difficult to achieve in matters of the environment as time went on. By
the summer of 1965, water pollution in the Great Lakes, particularly Lake Erie, became a key
issue in the public debate. Scientific evidence had been made public that declared, “...the lake
had become a ‘dead sewer’ due to an influx of ‘artificial nutrients’ [which] prompted an outcry in
the national press,” (Huffman 2000: 114). The political pressure to respond was so strong that
Governor Knowles established a committee on water resources in September of 1965. This
presented a distinct challenge for Knowles and the Kellett Committee; with water pollution
issues in the spotlight, it became increasingly unclear how Republicans, especially conservatives,
could reconcile supporting the interests of major polluters (such as the company that Kellett ran)
while regulating their activities in ways that would satisfy the citizens of Wisconsin.
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The quandary of Wisconsin Republicans became even more apparent when the Kellett
Commission presented the first version of their government reorganization plan in the summer of
1966. The plan called for the reorganization and restructuring of around ninety state agencies
into twenty-eight centralized departments and boards. One of the most contested of these
changes was a merger of the Conservation Department and the Department of Resource
Development to create the first environmental “super agency” in the United States - four years
before the creation of the US Environmental Protection Agency (Huffman 2000). In addition, the
reorganization proposed to disband the Wisconsin Conservation Commission and create a new
three member commission that, unlike the Conservation Commission, was made up of political
appointees. Despite the fact that the public mostly favored reorganization, the reaction of the
conservation establishment indicated that this merger was not what they had requested.
According to Huffman (2000), “The initial outburst by the conservation establishment greatly
surprised Governor Knowles. Embroiled in an intense gubernatorial campaign...Knowles
immediately moved to distance himself from the political implications of the merger, striving to
retain as much of the ‘conservation vote’ as possible,” (150).
Public Intervenor v. DNR. (1983) Wisconsin Supreme Court
Between 1980 and 1983, the public intervenor faced its first major legal challenge against
the Department of Natural Resources (Public Intervenor 1983). The initial lawsuit was brought
forth by the public intervenor against the DNR starting in 1980. In January of 1980, the DNR
proposed rules regarding pollution and cleanup regulations for the beds of waterways. The DNR
held public hearings and gave the intervenor three weeks notice before those hearings. However,
the intervenor urged the DNR to give more notice of those meetings. In March, the Natural
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Resources Board (NRB) approved the rules proposed by the DNR without the proposed
additions given by the intervenor. When the intervenor filed a petition to review the rules, the
DNR responded with a motion to dismiss. The motion by the DNR was rejected by the court and
the intervenor was allowed to reevaluate the rule’s validity. However, another court ruled in 1981
that the actions of DNR, in fact, were a valid exercise of their rulemaking authority given to
them in the Wisconsin Constitution. By 1983, this decision was appealed and the case made its
way to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin which consisted at the time of mostly conservative
justices. In a 5-2 decision, the Court ruled that the public intervenor did not have the authority to
intervene in matters of the DNR as a legal equal unless the legal processes were initiated by
actors outside of their office. In other words, when it came to cleaning up waterways, the public
intervenor could only involve themselves directly in court processes if they co-opted existing
cases. In the majority opinion, Justice Steinmetz (Public Intervenor v. DNR 1983) wrote:
The legislature has already created the DNR to represent the public in guarding our state's
resources and placed a check on fears of bureaucracy by requiring the agency's
administrative rules to be approved by appropriate legislative committees, which
occurred in this case. The public intervenor under the enabling statute does not have the
legal capacity to seek a declaratory judgment against the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources nor the Natural Resources Board for a determination of the
constitutionality of ch. NR 345, Wis. Adm. Code.

However, this decision was not made without dissent. Joined by Justice Shirley
Abrahamson, Justice William Bablitch prepared a scathing dissent of the majority’s decision. The
dissent noted that the decision to establish precedent that relegated the intervenor to a subservient
position under the DNR was against the legislative intent of the public intervenor in the first
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place. Bablitch pointed out that challenging the authority of the DNR was the foundation of the
purpose of the public intervenor. He highlighted that:
The decision in this case also ignores the legislative history behind the creation of the
official of the public intervenor...Thus, the sole basis for the creation of the public
intervenor was to create an adversarial force independent of the newly created DNR. That
concept is seriously undermined by the majority's holding in this case, and certainly
destroyed with respect to challenging an administrative rule.
A large part of the struggle which established the public intervenor was based on the assertion by
the Conservation Commission and the Red Shirts that the DNR needed to be held accountable
for their actions. Without including conservation interests, the agency could be easily influenced
by politically powerful businesses that pollute. Therefore, according to Bablitch:
The legislature could not have intended to provide the public intervenor with a duty to
protect the public interest without the right to challenge an administrative rule that could
cause irreversible damage to public rights in state waters. That an administrative rule has
the potential to cause irreparable harm to the public's interest in water is obvious. The
majority's decision, however, renders the public intervenor powerless to challenge such a
rule and to fulfill the legislative mandate of sec. 165.07, Stats.

Less than three months passed before similar sentiments were echoed by conservationists,
concerned citizens, and state officials in public hearings (The Sheboygan Press 1984a; The
Sheboygan Press 1984b).
The 1995 Elimination of the Public Intervenor: From the Power of Letters to the Power of
Dollars
The context for the next debate about the public intervenor was framed in distinctive
neoliberal discourse in which politicians appeared to be influenced more by dollars than the
letters from constituents that swayed them in the 1960s and 1980s. After his re-election in 1995,
Conservative Governor Tommy Thompson proposed radical changes to the state budget for
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1995-1997, including deep funding cuts to a number of regulatory agencies. Some of the most
drastic of the proposed cuts directly influenced the structure of Wisconsin’s environmental
regulators: the DNR and the public intervenor. First, Governor Thompson aimed to centralize
political control over the DNR by altering the selection process of the head of the agency
(Anderson 1995). Rather than the head of the DNR being chosen by a Citizens Advisory Board,
the head would be chosen by the governor. Additionally, the proposed budget called for severe
cuts to the DNR, including the elimination of over 400 staff members (Sinykin 2004).
Simultaneously, the public intervenor, the “watchdog” that was supposed to keep the DNR in
check, was eliminated by cuts to the Attorney General’s office. The combination of these
proposed radical changes prompted immediate outcry from constituents all over the state of
Wisconsin.
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Chapter 6: Critical Debates and a Critical Juncture in CAFO Development

Changes in Political Discourse- 1967, 1984, and 1995
Through a comparative analysis of these three debates around the public intervenor,
critical differences in these periods across time can be identified which address why the
intervenor was created, remained a position for almost thirty years, and was eventually
eliminated. Indeed, the shift towards neoliberalization was not necessarily linear, effortless, or
“rational.” Attempts to put the state of Wisconsin on a path towards neoliberalization failed
multiple times before it was finally implemented in the 1990s. These failed attempts to establish
regulatory regimes that would relegate conservation to a powerless position illustrated how much
power the conservation voters had in the state up until the 1990s, regardless of the ideology of
the dominant party. Throughout all of the periods, the debates can be divided between business
and conservation interests with business interests consistently against the existence of the public
intervenor. However, the scope of pro-business narratives changed over time. In the 1960s, the
focus from the business community was on efficiency and fiscal responsibility in government.
By the 1990s, the central focus of Thompson and fellow Republicans, who were politically
supported by corporate interests, was on economic growth through deregulation- a position that
was central to the state-corporate neoliberal project.
The change in political discourse corresponded with changes in political power dynamics
between politicians, conservationists, and members of the business community across time. The
bill that called for reorganization in the 1960s did not include a compromise, but was forced to
create one through political pressure by the conservationists as directly noted by Kellett

!36
(Waukesha Daily Freeman 1967). The environmentalists, hunters, and sportsmen resisted
attempts to combine conservation and development for fear that their interests would take a
backseat to business interests, particularly the paper industry which was one of the largest
industries (and polluters) in the state at the time. It was not only the power of the conservation
movement, but the weakness of business in comparison that forced Republican politicians and
business leaders to back down despite strong opposition by Governor Knowles. As time moved
on, as illustrated by the 1984 debate, business interests became more organized and united
against the public intervenor, whose increase in power “scared [them] to death.” Still, during the
1984 debate, politicians remembered 1967 and did not want to mess with the public, particularly
rural populations with positive experiences with the intervenor who “wrote more letters” (The
Sheboygan Press 1984b).
However, the presence of this “noisy” (as it was called in the press) conservation
constituency declined over time and made the opposition to the elimination of the public
intervenor far less visible within the public sphere. The red shirts in the 1960s used mobilization
tactics to flood town halls with people, create mass demonstrations, and send letters to elected
officials. While thousands of letters were sent to Thompson, legislators, and the press as a plea
for them to retain the public intervenor, there was not an existing social movement with similar
political clout or mobilization techniques as the red shirts in the previous periods. There was far
less input from individual citizens, from interviews during town hall meetings to letters to the
editor, in 1967 compared to both 1984 and 1995. In 1995 in particular, the bulk of citizen input to
the media were from individual environmentally concerned citizens and not members of
sportsmen, hunting, or environmental groups.
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Throughout the narratives from business interests and pro-business politicians between
1984 and 1995, there was a shift in the meaning of who was a conservationist. According to
these new narratives, which were absent in 1967, conservationists were not the “good old
sportsmen” and hunters from the past. Rather, they were radical environmentalists portrayed as a
type of moral carpetbagger, coming from national movements into Wisconsin where they do not
belong. This partially had to do with a decline in the constituency of sportsmen and hunters, but
also a growth in the visibility of organized environmental groups, which at the time were
portrayed as radical and violent by both state and national media due to a surge of direct-action
tactics and eco-terrorism amongst environmentalists throughout the 1980s-1990s (Taylor 1995).
This narrative not only fit in with larger media narratives at the time, but did so in a politically
potent way that distracted from the reality of the groups that primarily used the public intervenor
which included rural residents, small farmers, environmentally concerned citizens, sportsmen,
and local citizen groups. While members of larger environmental organizations were there, they
were not representatives from the larger organization, but from state chapters specific to
Wisconsin. However, the narrative that the intervenor was supported by well-funded
environmental groups disguised a politically unpalatable reality: it would disproportionately
impact rural residents and small farmers if the intervenor was eliminated.
The 1967 Debate
At this time, amid the rise of the environmental movement (Cable and Benson 1993) and
before neoliberalism had even emerged according to the dating of most scholars (Arrighi 1994;
Harvey 2005), the political debates were more balanced in terms of political influence of the
parties involved. As we bring macro-level debates on neoliberalism down to the state level, we
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see that conservation not only used to be a bi-partisan issue, but conservationists yielded
significant political power in Wisconsin. While the businesses interests that backed the Kellett
bill were politically influential, the conservation establishment could not be ignored. The
conservation establishment consisted of legislators backed by rural areas in Northern Wisconsin
and sporting and outdoor interests which were often called the “red shirts.” After Knowles was
re-elected in November of 1966 and he reintroduced the Kellett Committee’s recommendations
as a bill, Knowles again found himself pitted against this powerful conservation establishment.
However, because of the stable Republican majority achieved during the election and a new term
ahead, Knowles did not table the recommendations like he had done during election season. This
set the stage for a critically important conflict in the history of Wisconsin’s environmental
politics: the red shirt rally. The reorganization bill was proposed on January 27, 1967. The
conservation establishment mobilized in less than two weeks. As noted by Huffman (2000) and
state media sources (The Post Crescent 1967a; Janesville Daily Gazette 1967; Wausau Daily
Herald 1967a),
As the legislature met on February 8, 1967, a large number of red shirts from the Dane
County area, organized by Conservation Department staff, drove a "bulldozer type
construction machine" and a dump truck around the capitol square carrying banners
entitled "Stop the Kellett Bulldozer, Save Conservation." This entourage included upside
—down American flags and a dog with a protest banner lashed to its back (155).
This rally was the starting point of a vigorous debate about the future of the regulation of natural
resources in Wisconsin.
The political discourse throughout this debate indicated that support for the merger was
most contentious between business and conservation interests. Support for the merger came
almost exclusively (aside from the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin) from actors that had a
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stake in expanding economic development. These included taxpayer associations, an aluminum
company, the Wisconsin Manufacturers Association, the paper industry, as well as Kellett and the
business leaders that formed the commission (Green Bay Press Gazette 1967a; Wausau Daily
Herald 1967a). The governor in the middle of this debate went public with a strong stance in
favor of the complete merger. However, while Republicans supported the merger, many of them,
especially those from districts with significant levels of support for conservationists, were
pressured to support conservationists. Indeed, many of these Republicans were sportsmen
themselves. Conservationists united firmly against the bill. This coalition included numerous
politically active red shirts, members of the Conservation Commission, the Wisconsin Wildlife
Federation, the Wisconsin Conservation Congress, members of the state press, Democrats and,
over time, an increasing number of Republicans.
Arguments presented in favor of the merger repeatedly included language that reflected
goals of the business community. The argument that appeared most often was in favor of adding
“modern efficiency” to the state government (Green Bay Press Gazette 1967a; Wausau Daily
Herald 1967a; Oshkosh Northwestern 1967). Indeed, that was the stated purpose of the Kellett
task force in the first place. Although efficiency was touted as a key goal of the legislation by its
proponents, legislators and Governor Knowles especially highlighted cost-saving measures that
would result from the bill. For example, Knowles said to the Janesville Daily Gazette (1967) at
his keynote speech in support of reorganization, “This bill will revitalize the government
structure of Wisconsin, it will increase efficiency and government responsiveness of that
government, and over the years it will save many millions of taxpayer dollars.” However, Kellett
acknowledged that this argument alone was weak in the face of angry conservation voters. Soon
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before the bill was introduced, he told the Sheboygan Press (1967a), “We are not trying to sell
our plan on the basis that it will save a certain sum of money. It will fall flat on its face if we try
to justify it on this basis at this time.” Additionally, the language of expertise was used in the
state press to describe the Kellett Commission and their recommendations. The logic of those
who supported the conclusions of the commission noted that these were the experts in business,
thus those who opposed, specifically the red shirts, missed the point. An article in the Green Bay
Press Gazette (1967b) presented the red shirts as “noisy” and asserted that they had adopted a,
“cultist belief that the existing commission is the best of all possible schemes, that to suggest its
modification is akin to treason…”
While the entire reorganization bill could have potentially saved money and made the
government more efficient, those were not the core concerns of the conservation establishment
who were focused specifically on the merger between the Departments of Conservation and
Resource Development. They viewed the experts of the business community in matters of
conservation as inherently biased towards the interests of business over conservation. In
legislative hearings and the state media, red shirts, “...averred that the Conservation Department
stood for the public interest, in juxtaposition to other state agencies, like the Public Service
Commission and the Department of Resource Development, that were ‘agents of industry’ and
environmental exploitation,” (Huffman 2000: 154).
Additionally, advocates of the conservation establishment questioned why this merger
was happening in the first place. Opponents of the merger noted that not only did the existing
agency operate efficiently (Pearson 1967: Hemp 1967), but also the proposed plans would have
made the agency more inefficient through agency changes (Wausau Daily Herald 1967b;
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Stevens Point Journal 1967). This debate occurred after complex changes were made to
Wisconsin’s water pollution legislation. However, these changes were still being implemented.
Dick Hemp, president of the Wisconsin Wildlife Federation, told the Wausau Daily Herald
(1967):
As for the Resource Development Department, which has been given the responsibility of
administering the water resource, it is just getting organized under the legislative
guidelines laid down in the new Water Pollution Control Act enacted less than a year ago.
Its policy board members contend that to impose a merger at this time would merely
compound confusion in the many new procedures required under the act, which,
incidentally is also described as one of the best in the nation.
With water pollution issues in the spotlight, it was difficult for bureaucrats not only in the
Department of Conservation, but also the Department of Resource Development to justify the
merger.
Sportsmen, conservation groups, and politicians, both Democrat and Republican also
exhibited concern regarding the political legitimacy of the merger requested by the Kellett
Commission. In one letter to the editor in the Wausau Daily Herald, Bertha Pearson (1967)
asked:
I would like to quote from a letter just received from the Wisconsin Manufacturers
Association: ‘The measure proposes the consolidation of over 90 separate units into 14
operating departments plus a number of independent agencies, all functioning with direct
administrative responsibility to the Governor.’ I thought we were living in a democracy.
Why change to a one-man rule of all our agencies?
The suggestion that the merger would be overseen by a salaried three-member board of political
appointees while the Conservation Commission would be reduced to an advisory role was a key
point of contention in the debate and articles from the state media indicate that Kellett was aware
of how contentious this move was. The Wausau Daily Herald (1967b) noted:
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The Kellett committee has already admitted one ‘mistake.’ Originally it asked for a three
member paid commission to set the policy for the program. Under pressure, the
committee revised that proposal to establish a nine member unpaid board of control.
Commissioner Smith points to the danger of having a board of unpaid volunteers setting
policies for such diverse activities...If the job proved too big the next likely step would be
to ask for a paid commission to run the show full time. Yet this idea has already been
discarded, even by the Kellett group.
Conservation Commissioner Charles Smith claimed that it was a “trend toward
dictatorship,” (Wausau Daily Herald 1967a). They believed that the changes would result in
conservation interests becoming toothless. This idea was not exclusive to the red shirts. As noted
in the Green Bay Press Gazette (1967d), “‘Control of conservation,’ said [Senator] LaFave,
should not be surrendered to people ‘who believe that industry should dominate the use of water
and make a profit.’” Without a committee with independence and force behind it,
conservationists were concerned that business interests would overshadow their input.
The Compromise: Usurping the Kellett Bulldozer
Initially, Republicans were committed to the passage of the Kellett reorganization plan in
its entirety. The 1966 election season had been favorable to Republicans, which controlled the
Senate, Assembly, and the position of governor. However, by March of 1967, their vision was
cast into doubt in the face of an organized and politically active conservation movement. In
addition to the red shirt rally, the conservation establishment wrote aggressively to their
representatives and inundated town halls. As a result of this pressure, the legislature over the next
few weeks could not pass the reorganization bill. During the March 8 session, a bitter debate
ensued which resulted in five Republicans defecting from the majority in their objection to the
natural resources merger. The debate in the legislature reportedly became so contentious that it
tabled debates on the merger for another month (Green Bay Press Gazette 1967c). According to
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the Sheboygan Press (1967b), “Furor over a conservation merger still stalks the fate of the
Kellett bill on government reorganization, now set for a senate vote March 8. ‘Without some
kind of compromise on conservation, I do not see how we can get the votes to pass the bill,’
Senate Majority Leader Jerris Leonard said Tuesday.”
The April session did not prove to be much easier. After two weeks of debates, it became
increasingly clear to the legislature and the governor that without compromise, the fate of the bill
seemed bleak (Waukesha Daily Freeman 1967). At this point, several Republicans, feeling the
pressure from their constituents, became more amenable to the idea of compromise. For
example, Senator Reuben LaFave (R-Oconto) “vowed to battle all the way to leave conservation
alone. He said he was armed with petitions signed by 4,000 persons at Conservation congress
meetings opposing the merger,” (Waukesha Daily Freeman 1967). Three days later, the
Sheboygan Press published an article that claimed some Republicans were willing to take into
account the concerns given by conservationists. According to the Sheboygan Press (1967c):
[Senator] Keppler and a group of his Republican colleagues met in conference in his
capitol office Friday with key spokesmen of the Conservation Department. Although
lawmakers were reluctant to discuss the meeting, the Sheboygan Press learned of the
latest ‘compromise’ effort to ‘save’ the Kellett bill would keep the Conservation
Department intact as an independent agency but place in under supervision of a natural
resources board.
By the end of April, a final compromise had been produced. The compromise deferred the
decision for the merger until 1969 but added an amendment that shifted the role of the
Conservation Commission to a Natural Resources Board with a majority on that board in favor
of conservation interests. Although this was not ideal for Kellett or Governor Knowles, Kellett
indicated that the passage of a bill with compromise was better than no bill at all (Wausau Daily
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Herald 1967c). However, Kellett recognized that this compromise would not have occurred
without an organized conservation movement. As reported by Dean Jensen of the Sheboygan
Press (1967b),
...Kellett said the ‘pressures of various conservation groups’ was a major factor for the
senators’ decision to turn over the controversial merger to the 1969 legislature. ‘The
trouble is,’ Kellett explained, ‘there wasn’t enough support by taxpayers and business
groups to offset the effects of the conservationists.’”

The Governor, who was also aware of this stalemate, agreed to sign the compromise.
While the merger between the Department of Resource Development and the Department
of Conservation would eventually occur by 1969, within the compromise amendment was a
mandate for the creation of a public intervenor. In the reorganization bill, the powers of the
Attorney General underwent “considerable enhancement” (Wyngaard 1967). This included the
new role of appointing a public intervenor who, as a judicial overseer, “...was empowered to
‘formally intervene’ where needed ‘for the protection of ‘public rights’ in water and other natural
resources.’” (Huffman 2000: 164). Indeed, the legal mandate for the public intervenor was
influenced deeply by the demands of the conservation establishment.
The 1984 Debate: A Populist Defense of the Public Intervenor
After the Supreme Court ruling, it appeared that not only legal experts took issue with the
ruling, but so did local populations, particularly rural residents. On February 2, 1984, in response
to this growing opposition, the Environmental Resources Committee of the State Assembly
proposed a bill at a public hearing which sought to “...restore and further define the powers of the
intervener,” (The Sheboygan Press 1984a). In this hearing, the groups that provided support for
empowering the public intervenor included citizens groups (such as the Brown County
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Conservation Alliance and the Appleton “Save Downtown Committee), Democratic legislators,
the Wisconsin Environmental Decade, the League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, local chapters
of national environmentalist groups (like the Sierra Club), legal experts from the University of
Wisconsin and the Center for Public Representation, and local small farmers (Fond Du Lac
Commonwealth Reporter 1984; The Sheboygan Press 1984a). During this period, Democrats
controlled the Senate, Assembly, and the governorship. Although the effort to restore the
intervenor had bipartisan political support, Democrats had such a large majority that Republican
support on this issue was not essential. Throughout public hearings and press accounts, the most
active groups against empowering the intervenor were dominated, almost exclusively, by wellorganized corporate interests with agribusinesses as the most vocal opponents (Green Bay PressGazette 1984). In the February hearing, all of the people that voiced opposition were from
industry groups. This observation was echoed by Democratic State Representative Jeffrey
Neubauer at a public hearing. He told the Sheboygan Press (1984a):
…[Neubauer] found it significant that, “It was rural people coming into town to tell us
how much they want it (the public intervenor) while those against it were from large,
well-organized, well funded Madison based agri-business lobbies. I’d like to have the
support of everybody on this, but if I have to take my choice, I’ll choose the rural people
every time; they write more letters.”

Some opponents of the public intervenor included Wisconsin Food Processors Association, Farm
Bureau Federation, Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable Growers association, Wisconsin AgriBusiness Council and pork producers of Wisconsin (Green Bay Press-Gazette 1984; The
Sheboygan Press 1984b). At a public hearing in Madison early February, all of the individuals
that testified against the intervenor were from farm lobby groups.
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Amongst the arguments given against the public intervenor was the claim that the
intervenor needed to stay within its legal limits. However, at this point, it was still under dispute
as to what those limits were. The head of the DNR at the time, Carroll Besadny, despite claiming
that the agency would not take an official position in the debate, still claimed that the public
intervenor was established as a mere “means of expression” for the conservation minority and
was not intended to be an adversarial force (Green Bay Press-Gazette 1984). This was the
preferred interpretation by agribusinesses who believed the intervenor was becoming too
powerful and had serious potential to impede their business activities. Indeed, for Russell
Weisensel, a representative of both the Wisconsin Agri-Business Council and Wisconsin Pork
Producers, the notion that the public intervenor had the legal authority to take cases to court
“scares me to death,” (The Sheboygan Press 1984b). Specifically, agri-businesses were
concerned that, if expanded, the public intervenor would be able to initiate lawsuits against
businesses and individuals rather than the DNR alone. This was especially the case for the
Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable Growers Association, an organization that was still reeling from
a controversy in which, “...aldicarb- a potato bug killer- showed up in wells several years ago
near the Central Sands farm fields of Central Wisconsin where the pesticide had been heavily
used, having percolated down through the sandy soils into underground water tables,” (Post
Crescent 1984). Indeed, the public intervenor had taken actions against pesticide use before and
the Wisconsin Potato and Vegetable Growers Association was concerned that if expanded, they
would find themselves up against the intervenor again (The Sheboygan Press 1984b).
Other business interests, which included representatives from the Farm Bureau
Federation and the Wisconsin Food Processors Association, said that they did not see a reason
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why the public intervenor was legally necessary in the first place- which is similar to the
perspective of the head of the DNR. As noted by William Kasakaitis, a lobbyist for the
Wisconsin Food Processors Association, “The legislature created the DNR to conserve our…
natural resources. I don’t think we need these extracurricular activities on the part of the public
intervenor,” (Fond Du Lac Commonwealth Reporter 1984). These “extracurricular activities” did
not, according to Roger Cliff of the Farm Bureau Federation, protect the people that needed it.
He claimed in a public hearing that, “‘I don’t see why we have a public intervenor,’ Cliff said.
‘Our view of the public intervenor’s office is that basically it fronts for environmental groups
which are already provided with extensive resources they can call upon. We in the Farm Bureau
don’t have those resources and are at a great disadvantage,’ (The Sheboygan Press 1984a).
However, this perspective was immediately disputed by Olav Van Look, a local farmer who ran a
dairy farm with his wife, Diane. Van Look and other small farmers took issue with the Farm
Bureau Federation who claimed to represent the interests of all members of the Farm Bureau.
“Van Look whose testimony followed Cliff’s, disputed that Cliff spoke for a constituency of
farmers. ‘I’m a member of the Farm Bureau too and I don’t agree with what the fellow said.
Don’t let him tell you he speaks for all of us. He doesn’t,’” (The Sheboygan Press 1984a).
Indeed, the arguments for the elimination of the public intervenor stood in stark contrast
with the narratives put forth in favor of keeping it. According to the Sheboygan Press (1984a):
For a handful of local farmers who were among many private citizens and representatives
of citizens groups who took the day off to travel to the capitol building in Madison,
Friday, it was a way of paying a debt. Farmers who had contended with industrial
pollution in rural areas and members of citizen groups formed locally to protect the
environment were there to testify before the environmental resources committee on
behalf of the public intervenor’s office.
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While the arguments from industry groups claimed the DNR was capable of protecting water
resources without the aid of the public intervenor, the narratives given by farmers, citizen groups,
and conservation groups reflected the opposite. Unlike the industry representatives, advocates of
the intervenor recounted their experiences with the intervenor’s office versus the DNR. The
Sheboygan Press (1984a) reported:
“After years of banging our heads against a brick wall to try to prevent the Golden
Guernsey Osman Co-op from polluting out woods with dairy waste, we got somebody on
our side. We got somebody to advise us on how to play the game,” Diane Van Look,
Manitowoc County dairy farmer told the committee… Olav Van Look testified in
addition to his wife on the role the intervenor had played in the couple’s fight to get the
DNR to force Golden Guernsey Osman plat to abandon its failed ridge and furrow waste
system located above the Van Look woods. He said the family would have been unable to
pay the kind of money necessary “just to fight an issue the Department of Natural
Resources should have taken care of in the first place. Finally the DNR admitted, yes,
there is pollution there. Finally with a push from the public intervenor, they decided to do
something about it.”
For the Van Looks, getting the DNR alone to take their claims of pollution seriously was almost
impossible and without the public intervenor’s help, the alternative would have been to hire a
lawyer which they could not afford. This claim was echoed by Caryl Terrell, the legislative
coordinator for the Wisconsin chapter of the Sierra Club. Amongst Terrell and other members of
the Sierra Club, the DNR repeatedly failed to, “... enact rules to protect resources because of
political considerations or because an unclear legal mandate inhibits the DNR,” (The Sheboygan
Press 1984b). If the public intervenor did not exist to pressure the DNR, according to Terrell,
there would be a gap in the legislative process. Concern about this gap was also brought up by
Norman Hicks, a representative from the Brown County Conservation Alliance, whose
experiences working with the DNR led him to think that the agency was either “blind or
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deaf” (The Sheboygan Press 1984b). Rebecca Layton, also a member of Brown County
Conservation Alliance, stated that (The Sheboygan Press 1984b):
“People tend to feel helpless,” she told the Environmental Resources Committee at the
public hearing on the intervenor bill. “They tend to believe that you can’t fight city hall.
There’s nothing more intimidating than going to a hearing and facing row after row of
three-piece suits. It gives you confidence to have a person (the intervenor) who says yes,
you do have a point, and we will help you make that point.”
The claim was made repeatedly that the public intervenor was necessary not only for large
groups that had an interest in protecting the environment such as the Sierra Club, but for regional
interests like the Brown County Conservation Alliance and particularly rural residents who often,
“...may be unfamiliar with ways of making their feelings known where and when it counts,” (The
Sheboygan Press 1984b).
Along with rural residents and environmental groups, legal experts, including Ed Garvey,
the Deputy Attorney General, opposed the elimination of the public intervenor on the grounds
that the Supreme Court did not properly interpret the legislative intent of the public intervenor
when it was established and, for this reason, voiced his support for the bill to restore it (The
Sheboygan Press 1984b). An op-ed by the Sheboygan Press echoed this logic when they wrote,
“‘The dissenting opinion in the case said the majority opinion ‘ignores the clear and unequivocal
language and intent’ of the statute which created it, ‘ignores the legislative history behind the
creation… and leads to a result the legislature could have never intended.’ We agree,’” (1984c).
This interpretation was endorsed by Arien Christensen, a professor of law at the University of
Wisconsin and Louise Trubek of the Center for Public Representation.

!50
Restoration and Expansion of the Public Intervenor
After the state became aware of a growing public health concern involving pesticides and
private wells, their response was to construct new regulations for protecting groundwater
resources. This multi-year effort culminated in the creation of the 1984 Groundwater Billofficially named AB 595- and was signed into law on May 4, 1984. The bill, which was
originally designed to protect drinking water sources from industrial chemicals, pesticides, and
garbage dumps, included an amendment which not only restored the office of the public
intervenor, but gave them more legal authority despite strong opposition from organized and
well-funded agribusiness organizations. The amendment overturned the decision made by the
Wisconsin Supreme court. It gave, “Greater authority for the public intervenors of the state
Justice Department to initiate court action to protect water and other natural resources,” (The
Post Crescent 1984). After the public hearing in February, the amendment moved through the
legislature with little debate. It was approved and adopted onto the Groundwater Bill less than
two months after the initial public hearing, which indicates that the bill had political support in
addition to strong public support.
The 1995 Debate: Shifting from Populism to Profit
Support and opposition to the elimination of the public intervenor was, essentially,
divided between local peoples and politicians that supported economic growth. Groups that
strongly supported the elimination of the public intervenor either aimed to politically benefit
from large corporate entities (i.e. the Republicans that supported this bill) or directly represented
the interests of those corporations. For example, an article in the Post Crescent (1995c) noted:
Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade, citing reports filed with the state ethics board,
reports that pro-intervenor lobbyists were outgunned 11-1 in the spending war. The top
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eight groups that took positions against the intervenor- Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce, Wisconsin Realtors Association, Wisconsin Builders Association, Crandon
Mining Co., Wisconsin Paper Council, Wisconsin Farm Bureau, Fair Liquidation of
Waste, and Wisconsin Road Builders Association- spent $741,500.
However, the large amount of public response in favor of the public intervenor could be seen
throughout the data. Most of the calls for elimination did not come from the public, but from the
state or business interests. The Post Crescent (1995c) and the Madison Capital Times (1995)
strengthened this observation when they reported, “The governor’s mail, examined by the
Madison Capital Times under an Open Records Law request, showed only two people wrote in
support of cutting the intervenor’s office. One was a government affairs officer of a chemical
company. The other lived in a suburb of Washington, D.C.”
Indeed, the vast majority of references to the public intervenor throughout the data were
in reference to keeping the agency alive. The proposal to eliminate the public intervenor,
“reportedly has attracted more mail and phone calls to the governor and legislators than any
other in the huge budget, with public sentiment almost entirely in favor of keeping the intervenor
office in tact,” (The Post Crescent 1995c). Groups against eliminating the public intervenor
included most Democratic politicians (and some Republicans initially), local chapters of national
environmental organizations, local citizen groups, the League of Women Voters, hunters and
fishermen, and “average folks” (Erickson 1995; the Post Crescent 1995b). These average folks
were people that were not necessarily members of or claim to represent specific interest or
citizen groups. They included high school teachers, bookkeepers, and other environmentally
concerned residents of Wisconsin who wrote letters to the state press and described their
experiences with the intervenor. The desire to protect the public intervenor was so strong
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amongst citizens that groups who did not always work together, or even agree ideologically,
created a bipartisan coalition in support of the intervenor called “Friends of the Public
Intervenor” (The Post Crescent 1995a; Erickson 1995). According to the Post Crescent (1995b):
Friends of the Public Intervenor is an unusual alliance of conservation groups, generally
composed of somewhat conservative sportsmen, and activist environmental organizations
such as the Sierra Club and Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade. ‘We don’t usually swim
in the came circles,’ Ogletree said, ‘but this is an issue that is so sensitive, everyone found
themselves in the same boat saying, ‘I don’t like this.’
Thompson’s proposed budget became a catalyst to unite and mobilize any local group that
prioritized conservation interests. After the debate was over, the Green Bay Press Gazette
(Durkin 1995) noted, “If the infamous fight over Gov. Thompson’s budget did nothing else, it
served as a matchmaker for the state’s varied hoards of conservation and environmental groups.”
The groups and politicians that aimed to eliminate the intervenor formulated their two
key arguments using neoliberal logic. Specifically, arguments against the public intervenor
focused on cost saving and economic growth. The narrative of wasteful government spending
was the most prevalent among politicians and their staff. According to Thompson, the public
intervenor created “unnecessary costs for taxpayers” (The Post Crescent 1995c). If the public
intervenor was eliminated, Thompson claimed, it would save taxpayers over $300,000 in two
years (Mangan 1995). Politicians also claimed that the intervenor was a burden for business
development. In an interview with the Green Bay Press Gazette (Hildebrand 1995), “Thompson
has said the public intervenor should be eliminated because the office has used legal maneuvers
to slow economic development...” Indeed, as economic development grew in Wisconsin, the
relationship between the public intervenors, politicians, and businesses became more
contentious. In 1995, there were a number of controversial development projects in Wisconsin
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including the development of a mine for Exxon and a port expansion project (McClain 1995;
Hildebrand 1995b). One Republican State Representative noted, “The public intervenor would
have us shut down the harbor...I would say that might have a slight effect on the economy of
Brown County and the entire state of Wisconsin,” (Hildebrand 1995b). For many Republicans,
the public intervenor was not only an adversary of the DNR, but for business development in
general.
Another rationale used by politicians was the idea that the public intervenor no longer
served a purpose for Wisconsin’s environment. In other words, this form of argumentation
implicitly accepted the necessity of the public intervenor when it was first established but then
claimed that it had outlived its purpose and was legally unnecessary. According to an op-ed
written by Kevin Keane (1995), Thompson’s press secretary, “...today, we have dozens of very
strict and effective laws that protect our natural environment. We also have a very strong DNR,
whose charge is to protect our environment and ensure that is not being abused.” If the public
intervenor did serve a purpose, claimed Keane, it was to sue the state “at the request of the wellfinanced environmental movement” (Keane 1995). According to many Republicans, especially
Governor Thompson, the actions of the public intervenor are not only redundant compared to the
work of the “very strong” DNR, but did not reflect the will of Wisconsinites.
The narratives from citizens, politicians, and local organizations contrasted starkly with
the rhetoric used to encourage the elimination of the public intervenor. Throughout this debate,
citizens provided detailed stories in which they recollected their experiences with both the public
intervenor and the DNR. While Thompson and others argued that the public intervenor was
obsolete, a consistent theme within narratives that supported the intervenor was the idea that
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citizens believed that they would have had to navigate through Wisconsin’s complex
environmental regulatory system on their own without the intervenor’s assistance. For instance,
in their report on a town hall meeting, the Post Crescent described the story of a 70-year-old
rural resident and her experience with the public intervenor. According to the Culhane of the Post
Crescent (1995b):
Dorothy Spilde talked about well water so bad it turned her potatoes black when she
boiled them. She had to use bleach to clean her false teeth. The local sanitary district put
the well in for her when new sewer lines passed too close to her old well. Only the well
was bad. She tried calling the sanitary district. It did her no good. She called the state
Department of Natural Resources. No help. In fact, no one would help her until she
finally called the office of the public intervenor. An intern in that office waded into the
bureaucratic mess and eventually extracted a promise from the district to replace the well.
“No one gives a damn,” Spilde said. “Only the intervenor cared.” (Emphasis added)
Similar narratives were found in the Madison Capital Times (Krome 1995):
The painting of towering rocks along a rural Wisconsin road caught my eye as I stood in
the waiting room. Its windy, wild landscape cheek-by-jowl beside a farmer’s pastures
gave me a perfect image of Wisconsin’s natural beauty coexisting with the real world of
farms and businesses.... It turns out, the landscape I admired was painted by Halsey
Rinehart, a shopkeeper from Richland Center, who asked the intervenors to help protect a
scenic rock formation from being destroyed by a road-widening project. After
considerable negotiations, other ways were found to widen the road while sparing this
major geological treasure. Rinehart painted the rock-bridge landscape as thanks and a
tribute to the intervenor’s problem solving.
The public intervenor was also described as one of the few protections against powerful
corporate interests. As reported in the Madison Capital Times (Krome 1995):
And Tom LaBudde, a small businessman who cleans up soil contaminated by leaking
underground storage tanks, tells what happened when the DNR reviewed its rules on this
problem a couple of years ago. ‘Some of the nation’s biggest landfill companies got in the
face of the DNR board and staff, pushing lenient rules that favored landfill soils rather
than cleaning them up,’ he told me. LaBudde described a protracted fight in which the
intervenor often was the lone voice fighting for tough rules. In the end, the DNR was
forced to write rules that maintained tough environmental protections. ‘The environment
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was well served, taxpayers were, small businesses like mine were, and had the public
intervenor not been there, the wrong decision would have been made,’ LaBudde said.
The narratives that discussed the DNR did not reflect the “very strong” agency that Keane
described. Rather, the narratives portrayed the DNR as beholden to business interests and highly
inefficient. The agency did not communicate properly with the population and, as a result,
received more complaints than any other state agency in Wisconsin (Jenswold 1995).
Indeed, so many bureaucrats, small business owners, politicians and citizens spoke
positively about the public intervenor, there was speculation throughout the state media that the
elimination of the public intervenor did not serve the public at all. Right away, the narrative that
the state would save money was challenged because Thompson’s budget shifted over half of the
proposed amount saved by eliminating the intervenor directly to the Department of Development
(Schmitz 1995). In fact, when the budget was initially announced, the proposal to eliminate the
public intervenor even drew criticism from Republicans. For example, the Speaker of the State
Assembly David Prosser (R-Appleton) noted, “It seems to me that a rather small amount of
money would be saved by eliminating the office, but a large amount of havoc might be created if
they didn’t exist,” (Miller 1995).The issue, then, was not fiscal responsibility, but political
priorities which seemed to promote business development over environmental protection. Karen
Harvey in the Post Crescent (Erickson 1995) contended that:
...Thompson’s budget as a power-grabbing scheme masked in voter-friendly terms such
as ‘privatization’ and ‘deregulation.’ ‘We feel this budget, if passed, would create a
totalitarian form of government, basically a dictatorship,’ she said. ‘It’s a blueprint for the
centralization of power into the hands of a few, and we believe those few are the
governor and corporate interests.”
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The concern that the elimination of the public intervenor was a foot in the door for corporate
interests at the expense of the public was a consistent theme throughout the data (Culhane 1995a;
Tylka 1995; Gedicks 1995). An op-ed in the Fond du Lac Commonwealth Reporter (Seefelt and
Seefelt 1995) noted:
The chemical and agricultural interests have their representatives and lobbyists in the
legislative halls at Madison, but who is looking out for the interests of the rest of us? We
view the public intervenor office as the public’s lobbyist. Without the public intervenor,
we the citizens would be at the mercy of large corporate interests whose concerns are
primarily economic.
The public intervenor was repeatedly described as a lobbyist for the public, despite claims from
Republicans that the agency was the advocate for a well-funded environmental movement.
Towards the beginning of this debate, not all Republicans were willing to stand behind
the narrative that the public intervenor was backed exclusively by environmentalists. Even going
back to the 1980s, Senator Robert Cowles acted as one of the key Republicans in favor of
keeping the public intervenor. As a representative from a northern, lakeside district, Cowles was
aware of strong opposition to the budget by sportsmen and hunting groups. He noted that (The
Post Crescent 1995a):
Resolutions supporting the intervenor and opposing Thompson’s plan were passed at a
number of the county-level Wisconsin Conservation Congress’ annual spring meetings
recently. “That’s important for us to remember because it’s not just extreme
environmental types supporting the agency,”Cowles said.... “There’s lots of folks out
there- average folks- who have been assisted one way or another by the public
intervenor.”
However, as time went on and the debate divided along political party lines, even Republicans
who were once supportive of keeping the public intervenor faced intense political pressure from
their own party and Governor Thompson to back away from that position. Indeed the bulk of
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political pressure to eliminate the public intervenor came from the Governor himself and
Republicans in the legislature rather than the public. Thompson’s staff made it clear since the end
of April that, despite the influx of pleas to keep the intervenor, there would not be a compromise
under any circumstances. According to Keane, “Some things we will compromise on, but we’re
not about to compromise on the public intervenor,” (Hildebrand 1995). Thompson threatened to
veto any bill that would create a compromise for the public intervenor. By the end of June, even
Republicans such as Cowles called the effort to save the public intervenor “politically
impossible,” (Miller 1995b). By the time the votes were cast, not a single Republican voted to
preserve the office. As noted by The Post Crescent (Culhane 1995a), “Knowing that they had the
votes, the majority didn’t even debate the proposals.” In a final debate on the budget, “State Sen.
Joseph Leean, R-Waupaca, moved to table the Democratic amendment that would have left the
office unchanged. The motion rule is not debatable. After Democratic protests against being
silenced, the Senate voted 17-16 on party lines to table the motion, with Cowles joining the
Republican majority,” (Miller 1995b). The budget was approved and signed into law by
Thompson in July, eliminating the public intervenor despite widespread public support.
1995 as a Critical Juncture for Neoliberalization
The elimination of the public intervenor was a critical juncture for the development of
dairy CAFOs despite the fact that, at the time, the number of large dairy CAFOs in the state was
quite small compared to the scale today. The duties of the public intervenor and their interactions
with large scale farms and similar large industries before it was eliminated indicate that if the
public intervenor existed prior to 1995, it would have at least slowed down the rate of CAFO
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development. The process of initial elimination and subsequent legal changes followed what
Falleti and Mahoney (2015: 221) call a “self amplifying process.” Within this process:
...the initial events move the sequence in a particular direction, such that it becomes
more and more likely that the process will be expanded, increased, strengthened, or
otherwise enhanced. Over time, the process (or its outcome) does not remain stable but
increases, grows, or becomes more prominent as a result of self amplifying mechanisms.
The loss of the public intervenor put Wisconsin on a self amplifying path in which neoliberal
logic was made increasingly more attractive since there was no longer an adversarial force to
resist it. When the public intervenor was eliminated, the public lost an essential advocate in the
courts, the legislature, and against the DNR which tended to favor the interests of large
corporations. The public intervenor was not only established to create new environmental
regulations, but to ensure that existing ones were being enforced by the DNR. After the
elimination of the intervenor, farms, perhaps farms that existed on a smaller scale before,
expanded and did so rapidly over the span of 20 years (see figure 3).

Figure 3: CAFOs with WPDES Permits (WDNR 2015)
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Wisconsin’s pollution discharge elimination system (WPDES) permits correspond to the
size of a farm. Particularly, in the state of Wisconsin, a dairy farm is a CAFO if there are a
thousand “animal units” or about 800 dairy cows or more on one farm. The facility is also
capable of being designated a CAFO if they are found to have discharged waste into neighboring
wells or navigable waters (WDNR 2017). Despite the fact that this system was created in 1985,
at this point, dairy farmers in Wisconsin still, for the most part, operated on many small scale
farms rather than a few large scale farms. According to Gilbert and Akor (1988), the average
herd number for dairy farms in Wisconsin was 44 while in California during the same period, the
average was 343. As indicated in Table 3, the number of large dairy CAFOs which were
permitted for waste management when the intervenor was active was small and even smaller
than the number of poultry CAFOs operational at the time. However, before CAFO development
rapidly increased, articles from the press indicate that large scale farms were already creating
pollution problems in the early 1980s and even then, the DNR failed to provide meaningful
solutions to the problem until the public intervenor stepped in. Indeed, the presence of the public
intervenor was critical for WPDES permits to be applied to large scale agricultural operations in
the first place.
Up until 1985, the only facilities that were required to have a WPDES permit were
industrial and not agricultural operations. However, in the early 1980s, the political spotlight was
on groundwater pollution across the state. Several key cases involving manure pollution from
large scale farms, all of which involved the participation of the public intervenor, highlighted that
existing waste management regulations did not take into account the scale of the new CAFO
model. Existing regulations were not only weak, but they were not being enforced by the DNR
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even in the early 1980s. While small farmers did not want to be crushed by regulation, they
understood as rural residents themselves that they were necessary to protect water sources. The
failure of the DNR to stand up against business interests was a theme throughout the periods. As
previously noted, when the Van Look case against the went public, the focus was on the failure
of the DNR in addition to the lack efficient regulations. When the case was reviewed by the
natural resources board, they expressed “amazement” at the lack of DNR response (The
Sheboygan Press 1983). The case finally was heard by the board after the Van Looks tried to
work with the DNR for over 5 years. Despite being told by the DNR that they were sympathetic,
the agency in Madison did not have contact with their enforcement staff in Green Bay until after
the public intervenor testified on behalf of the Van Look couple in a public hearing.
After the elimination of the public intervenor, a number of laws were passed which
incrementally increased the ability of large farms to expand and pollute with little accountability,
therefore putting Wisconsin on a path towards neoliberalization. The Wisconsin legislature has
been solidly Republican since 1993. With the Republican focus on business development and
economic growth, the legislature has had little political will to strengthen and enforce
environmental regulations. As a result, aggrieved rural residents have turned to the courts and
zoning regulations as an attempt to protect the water resources in their communities. However,
since the elimination of the public intervenor, laws have been passed which attack any possible
legal maneuver available to the public that could potentially curb the development of large farms.
The loss of the intervenor was hard enough, but now the state was actively advocating economic
growth at the expense of the political agency of their own constituents. Two laws that serve this
purpose are the amended Right to Farm law and the Livestock Facility Siting Law. These

!61
subsequent laws reflected the neoliberal logic which encouraged the elimination of the
intervenor.
Right to Farm (RTF) laws are found in some form across every state in the U.S., but
Wisconsin’s RTF law is particularly restrictive. This law, originally passed in 1982 and amended
several times since, noted the extent to which rural populations were capable of engaging in
nuisance lawsuits. A nuisance occurs when activities of a neighbor cause significant
inconvenience or damage to either private or public property. The RTF law specifically addresses
nuisances that come from farms which includes smells, pollution, and noises associated with
agriculture. According to the Wisconsin Farm Bureau Federation (2011), “Wisconsin’s Right to
Farm law provides farmers with protections from frivolous nuisance lawsuits, allowing them to
practice agriculture without fear of legal action as long as they follow good production
practices.” Advocates of RTF law contend that the bulk of nuisance lawsuits against farms are
“frivolous,” many using cases of urban residents moving to the countryside, unaware of the
scents, sounds, and other problems that come with rural life. They posited that nuisance suits
were another obstacle for struggling farmers. However, not only was the original law passed to
overturn a lawsuit directed at a large CAFO, but there was little data to indicate frivolous
lawsuits were as severe of a problem as proponents claimed. For example, Rep. Judy Klusman,
R-Oshkosh who voted for an expansion of the law in 1996 told the Stevens Point Journal (1996),
“‘Farmers have unfortunately been hauled into court and literally driven out of business from
expensive lawsuits. It hasn’t really happened in Wisconsin yet. I wanted to make sure some
protections were there,’ Klusman said.” In 1981, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that a
16,000 chicken egg farm was found to be nuisance not only for neighbors, but for the entire
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community whose school was adjacent to a manure storage facility (Hansen 2002). The
community was not a recent development, but a rural community where many were small
farmers and others had lived for generations. The legislature responded by passing the RTF law
less than four months later. The original RTF law in Wisconsin limited the remedies available for
the plaintiff if the nuisance occurred on an area of land zoned for agriculture. If an agricultural
operation was found to be a nuisance yet it happened on land zoned for agriculture, the relief
given to the plaintiff “shall not substantially restrict or regulate such uses or practices, unless
such relief is necessary to protect public health or safety” (Hansen 2002). The state emphasized
the importance of local zoning in cases where agricultural nuisances could or have endangered
public health and safety. If the court rules that a nuisance was taking place on an area not zoned
for agricultural use, the court could order further regulation of the farm until the nuisance was
resolved. However, damages would be limited in cases in which the plaintiff moved onto their
property after the farm was operational.
A number of changes were made to the original law in 1995 which drastically
strengthened protections for farms, making Wisconsin’s RTF law one of the most broad RTF
laws in the country. This is of concern to legal scholars who note that, “While most state laws
involve a lawful exercise of the state's police powers, a right-to-farm law may set forth protection
against nuisances that is so great that it operates to effect a regulatory taking,” (Centner 2006).
First, the law stated that, rather than limited damages, if 1) the plaintiff moved onto their
property after a farm was operational, and 2) the nuisance is not a threat to public safety, a court
cannot rule that a farm is a nuisance (Hanson 2002). The statute severely limited the possibility
of private nuisance lawsuits by altering the language to say that no agricultural operation can be
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a nuisance unless they “present a substantial threat to public health or safety,” (Wisconsin State
Legislature 1996). Amendments added between 1997 and 1999 limit the lengths the state was
willing to go to curb agricultural development by restricting the remedies available to plaintiffs
even if the farm was found to be a public nuisance. According to Hanson (2002), the amended
RTF law limits the remedies available in 4 ways:
1)The relief awarded by the court may not substantially restrict the agricultural use or
practice. 2) If the court orders an agricultural operation to mitigate the nuisance, it must
consult the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) or the Department of Agriculture,
Trade, and Consumer Protection (DATCP) for suggested mitigation measures. 3) The
court must provide the agricultural defendant with at least one year to install the
measures. 4) Most significantly, any action that the court orders cannot substantially or
adversely affect the economic viability of the agricultural use.

While the 1982 laws were also created to encourage economic growth, they differed drastically
from the 1995 laws because they acknowledged that in some cases, economic activity had to be
curbed in order to protect the environment used by rural populations. By 1995, the law made
clear that the natural resources of rural communities were less of a concern than economic
development. It is additionally important to note that the nature of rural life is antithetical to
contexts where farms could pose a “threat to the public” as rural residents can live in areas that
are sparsely populated, limiting the number of people capable of being impacted by a single
agricultural operation.
Lastly, the 1995 RTF amendments added what amounts to a deterrent against lodging
nuisance lawsuits against agricultural operations to begin with. If the farm is accused and found
not guilty of committing a nuisance, the burden of paying for legal costs is placed on the
plaintiff. This places severe restrictions on the ability rural residents without economic means to
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use the courts to resolve land use conflicts between rural communities and agricultural
operations. For example, without the public intervenor, aggrieved citizens must use their own
resources to hire environmental lawyers. This is especially problematic if rural residents are up
against a large CAFO that is corporately owned and has a team of lawyers. In addition to the cost
of paying for lawyers, the state has made proving a nuisance incredibly difficult and even if
proved, the state will offer limited meaningful solutions. This not only impacts the utility of
using the courts for solutions to agricultural pollution, but it also deters people from suing at all
if they know that they could potentially end up owing substantial additional costs.
Since the public intervenor was no longer there to assist citizens navigate the courts,
many of them turned to using local zoning ordinances to control pollution problems within their
communities. However, in 2004 another law was passed which interfered with the abilities of
local townships to pass ordinances that curbed pollution to protect their water sources. The
Livestock Facility Siting Law has garnered significant controversy since it was first
implemented. According to the Dairy Business Association (2004):
The goal of this legislation is to build a partnership among agriculture, local
government, rural residents and environmental protection. This bill will establish
scientific standards for local governments to use and follow when making local
decisions that balance the needs of livestock producers who desire to expand with the
interests of citizens and communities.
Indeed, they encouraged the use of state policy and not “emotional sentiment,” a possible dig at
the very recent and highly publicized case of the Treml family in which a baby almost died due
to nitrate exposure from a family well polluted by Stahl Farms. Despite the Dairy Business
Association’s insistence that their position on the matter was objective and science based, they
failed to address their own conflicts of interest. The law firm that represented Stahl Farms in
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court also had a place on the Dairy Business Association’s board of directors (Midwest
Environmental Advocates 2005).
The Livestock Facility Siting Law, enacted in its current form in 2006, was written by
and for the dairy industry. This fact is in no way a secret. The DBA has repeatedly mentioned to
the media that since they wrote the law, they are the most qualified to respond to inquiries (Seely
2010a). According to Midwest Environmental Advocates (2016), “Though the law was intended
to provide consistency in livestock siting rules, local communities essentially have to rubberstamp applications and approve plans that may not be protective enough of local needs.” While
the law explicitly states that local governments have zoning authority, it biased the permit
approval process in favor of CAFOs. This law took power away from locally elected officials
because it created an incredibly complex regulatory system and expected local governments
which often do not have the expertise or resources to enact it on their own (Saul n.d.). The law
made it incredibly difficult for even well organized communities to engage in any meaningful
action that limited the polluting capabilities of CAFOs since those polluting actors were now
backed by the state. Indeed, when the town of Little Black rejected a proposal in 2009 for a
4,000 cow dairy CAFO due to water pollution concerns, they were met with a letter from the
Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection which stated, “If you
choose to pursue local requirements beyond the scope of the state siting law, the town will
expose itself to unnecessary legal challenges from applicants and other interested parties that the
town might not be able to defend,” (Seely 2010b). Little Black is not alone. Midwest
Environmental Advocates are still being sent letters from concerned localities about corporate
threats of legal action for attempting to protect their water resources.

!66
Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks
Summary of Findings
The purpose of this thesis was twofold: first, to understand through public debates why
the intervenor was eliminated and second, to understand how subsequent legal developments
after the elimination of the public intervenor put the dairy industry in Wisconsin on a selfamplifying path towards neoliberalization. Through the process of “tracing” the path of
neoliberalism through neoliberal discourse in the context of specific policy outcomes, I found
several key differences and similarities across each of the periods which not only highlight the
the political conditions that enabled neoliberal development through the state in Wisconsin, but
changes in political power dynamics in the state over time. Particularly, the influence of a
powerful conservation movement rather than organized business interests was critical to specific
legal outcomes.
The narratives in this thesis follow claims made in the literature that the state government
of Wisconsin fully embraced neoliberalism later than other places in the United States (Gilbert
and Amor 1988). While neoliberal logic was present in statements from some public officials and
corporate executives in 1984, those arguments were not broadly accepted by the public or the
state. Both politicians and citizens at that time accepted an understanding of government
regulation as necessary in order to protect natural resources and more broadly conserve
environments that are fundamental to the livelihood and outdoor lifestyles of rural residents.
Strikingly, the state took an aggressive stance advocating neoliberal logic and establishing
neoliberal policy in the 1990s even when it was against the expressed desires of the vast majority
of the public. The fact that the public response against the elimination of the intervenor was so
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strong yet it was still eliminated demonstrates how key the role of the state is in processes of
neoliberalization. This point is further strengthened by the subsequent adoption of a harsh RTF
law and siting law which required that even in cases where farms could harm the health of the
public, solutions to the problem could not negatively impact economic activities. In sum,
corporate interests behind the expansion of CAFOs relied on the state to lay the legal path for
them.
Indeed, throughout the entire existence of the intervenor, their mission and
accomplishments were disputed by business interests. Political rhetoric was employed by
business-friendly politicians and interest groups to portray the public intervenor as corrupt,
useless, wasteful, and even a political ploy used by radical environmentalists over all three
periods analyzed. Across all of the debates, business interests in Wisconsin, especially interests
such as the Dairy Business Association, the Wisconsin Cheesemakers Association, and the Farm
Federation Bureau, which prioritized the needs of large farms over small farms, were vocal in
expressing the viewpoint that the form of environmental regulation practiced by the public
intervenor was not conducive to business development. Indeed, the small farmers and rural
residents which consistently supported the public intervenor eventually became one of the groups
most negatively impacted by CAFO development. After its elimination, a gaping hole was left in
Wisconsin’s regulatory framework. After this critical juncture, there was no watchdog to keep the
DNR in check, no legal advocate to take the DNR to court (except for hired legal representation),
and less access to educational resources. Subsequent laws, including the amended Right to Farm
law and the Livestock Facility Siting law, were directly advocated by business groups and served
to limit any meaningful remedy offered by the state to curb CAFO development. Since the
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elimination of the public intervenor and other legal developments, the “regulatory burden” of
environmental regulation was lifted as limits on expansion of dairy CAFOs were effectively been
rendered non-existent
Raising a Stink: Wisconsinites and Recent Responses to CAFO Pollution
Despite the fact that it was eliminated over 20 years ago, Wisconsinites have not
forgotten the public intervenor. A fall 2016 newsletter from the Clean Water Action Council of
Wisconsin directly called for a return of the public intervenor in the face of growing concerns of
groundwater pollution caused by large CAFOs. According to Andy Wallander of the Clean Water
Action Council (2016):
Since 1995, the citizens of this state have had to undergo major environmental impacts
without the advice and assistance of a Public Intervenor’s Office. Corporations and
special interests have the lawyers, experts, support staff, public relations staff, and
budgets to launch promotional campaigns for their projects. Meanwhile, Average citizens
have had few resources to protect themselves. For example, the rapid spread of
concentrated animal feeding operations, or CAFOs, is clearly an issue which would have
involved the Public Intervenors Office as large numbers of Wisconsin citizens are
suddenly facing the imposition of huge industrial “farm” operations.
The Clean Water Action Council is keenly aware of the impact of the loss of the intervenor
because they and other non-profit groups like Midwest Environmental Advocates have had to
step in to fill the void left after its elimination. The newsletter additionally announced an antiCAFO demonstration in Madison, aptly named “Raise a Stink,” against the state for permitting
and encouraging what many citizens see as irresponsible farming practices (Clean Water Action
Council 2016). A press release for the demonstration stated (Dougherty 2016):
We The People have the power to change what no longer serves us but we must stand
together; unified in our message that we will exercise our collective power to protect our
rights to clean water, clean air and a good quality of life. It's time our elected officials in
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Madison decide to stand with us, the citizens of Wisconsin, and help us push back against
a greedy and immoral industry that is poisoning our rural communities. We are not
'radicals', 'tree-huggers' or 'environmental activists'. We are people who are protecting our
homes, our water, and quality of life from an industry with a horrid track record of
polluting rural communities.
The Raise a Stink demonstrations have occurred for 2 years and, due to the lack of response from
the state, are likely to continue for a third. The protests were attended by small farmers, rural
residents, environmentally concerned citizens, as well as representatives environmental nonprofits.
The elimination of the public intervenor put rural populations in a position where it was
nearly impossible to protect the environment of the communities they live in while,
simultaneously, it was easier for businesses to engage in environmentally harmful behaviors.
While there are laws addressing water pollution on the books, the DNR has been rendered
toothless by the state. Efforts to force the DNR, an already politicized and underfunded agency,
to do their jobs has proven to be frustrating and time consuming for aggrieved citizens. However,
this is a self fulfilling prophecy told by residents of Wisconsin since 1967. Over and over again,
throughout all of the periods, residents claimed that if there was no adversarial force to reign in
business interests, the state runs the risk of putting business interests before the health and wellbeing of their own population. This is exactly what occurred and continues to occur especially in
Northern Wisconsin. Narratives from small farmers and other small business owners claimed that
the DNR, in practice, did not stand up to business practices that violated the law even in 1984.
The addition of the RTF amendments and the Livestock Facility Siting Law compounded the
issues they were already facing and took away the few remaining legal mechanisms rural
populations had to protect themselves. As a result, rural communities all over Wisconsin are
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struggling to protect their water sources while neighboring CAFOs continuously expand with the
permission of the state.
In conclusion, the actions of the state of Wisconsin enhanced the likelihood of CAFO
expansion. In 1995, the Wisconsin reversed its history of populist support in favor of prioritizing
business development and this approach has not changed today. This thesis adds to the literature
that claims the state has a key role in processes of neoliberalization. Despite the fact that this
research is limited because of a specific focus on Wisconsin, it contributes to a growing
sociolegal scholarship concerned with the role of specific laws in processes of neoliberalization.
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